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Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am submitting supplemental 
authorities in response to issues emphasized in the Reply Brief of Appellants, especially at pages 
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Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) 
Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) 
United States v. Sanford. 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976) 
State v. Danielson, 427 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1967) 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of the United States 
State of MONTANA et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
UNITED STATES et al. 
No. 79-1128. 
Argued Dec. 3, 1980. 
Decided March 24, 1981. 
Rehearing Denied June 1, 1981. 
See 452 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 3042. 
The United States in its own right and as fiduciary 
on behalf of Crow Tribe of Indians sought to quiet 
title to the bed and banks of the Big Horn River. 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, 457 F.Supp. 599, declared that the state 
of Montana owned the bed and banks of the Big 
Horn River. The Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 
reversed and remanded, 604 F.2d 1162. On writ of 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, held 
that: (1) title to the bed of the Big Horn River 
passed to Montana upon its admission to the Union, 
and (2) the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to 
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on 
reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of 
the Tribe. 
Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and case 
remanded. 
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion dissenting in 
part, in which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
joined. 
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. 
West Headnotes 
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[1] Navigable Waters €=^36(1) 
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Waters and Water Courses €=3?89 
405k89 Most Cited Cases 
Owners of land riparian to nonnavigable streams 
may own adjacent riverbed, but conveyance by 
United States of land riparian to navigable river 
carries no interest in the riverbed, but, rather, 
ownership of land under navigable waters is 
incident of sovereignty. 
[2] Navigable Waters €^>36(1) 
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases 
As general principle, ownership of land under 
navigable waters is held in trust by federal 
government for future states, to be granted to such 
states when they enter Union and assume 
sovereignty on equal footing with established states. 
[3] Federal Courts €^>430 
170Bk430 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Navigable Waters €==>16 
270k 16 Most Cited Cases 
After state enters Union, title to land under 
navigable waters therein is governed by state law, 
subject to only one limitation, i. e., paramount 
power of the United States to ensure that such 
waters remain free for interstate and foreign 
commerce. 
[4] Navigable Waters €=>37(2) 
270k37(2) Most Cited Cases 
Congress may convey lands below high-water mark 
of navigable water, and so defeat title of a new 
state, in order to perform international obligations, 
or to effect improvement of such lands for 
promotion and convenience of commerce with 
foreign nations and among several states, or to carry 
out other public purposes appropriate to objects for 
which the United States holds the 
Territory. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et 
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seq., II, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 
Stat. 749. 
[5] Navigable Waters C^>37(1) 
270k37(l) Most Cited Cases 
[5] Navigable Waters C=>37(7) 
270k37(7) Most Cited Cases 
Control over property underlying navigable waters 
is so strongly identified with sovereign power of 
government that it will not be held that United 
States has conveyed such land except because of 
some international duty or public exigency, and thus 
court deciding question of title to bed of navigable 
water must begin with strong presumption against 
conveyance by the United States and must not infer 
such unless the intention was definitely declared or 
otherwise made plain or was rendered in clear and 
special words or unless claim confirmed in terms 
embraces land under waters of the stream. 
[6] Indians €=^12 
209k 12 Most Cited Cases 
[6] Navigable Waters €==>37(7) 
270k37(7) Most Cited Cases 
Mere fact that bed of navigable water lies within 
boundaries described in treaty does not make 
riverbed part of conveyed land, especially when 
there is no express reference to riverbed that might 
overcome presumption against its conveyance. 
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, 15 
Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Act 
Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4, 
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165; 
33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43 U.S.C.A. § 931. 
[7] Indians €==>12 
209k 12 Most Cited Cases 
Whatever property rights were created by treaty 
with Crow Tribe, there was failure to overcome 
established presumption that beds of navigable 
waters remained in trust for future states and passed 
to new states when they assumed sovereignty. 
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, IV, 
15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; 
Act Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4, 
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43 
U.S.C.A. §931. 
[8] Navigable Waters €^36(1) 
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases 
Title to bed of Big Horn River passed to state of 
Montana upon its admission into Union. Treaty 
With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, IV, 15 
Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat 749; 
Act Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4, 
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165; 
33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43 U.S.C.A. § 931. 
[9] Indians €=^32.6 
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32) 
Crow Tribe of Indians has power to prohibit 
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land 
belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States 
in trust for the Tribe, and if Tribe permits 
nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may 
condition their entry by charging fee or establishing 
bag and creel limits. Treaty With the Crow Indians, 
Arts. I et seq., II, 15 Stat 649; Act Feb. 8, 1887, 
ch. 119, 24 Stat 388; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 
Stat 751. 
[10] Indians €==>3(1) 
209k3(l) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k3) 
Purposes of 1851 Treaty with Crow Tribe were to 
assure safe passage for settlers across lands of 
various Indian tribes, to compensate Tribes for loss 
of buffalo, other game animals, timber and forage, 
to delineate tribal boundaries, to promote intertribal 
peace and to establish way of identifying Indians 
who committed depredations against non-Indians. 
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749. 
[11] Indians €=^12 
209kl2 Most Cited Cases 
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty with Crow Tribe 
obligated United States to prohibit most 
non-Indians from residing on or passing through 
reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe. 
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat. 
649;18U.S.C.A. § 1165. 
[12] Indians €^13(1) 
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Policy of Allotment Act was eventual assimilation 
of Indian population and gradual extinction of 
Indian reservations and Indian titles. Indian 
General 
Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25 U.S.C.A. § 331 et 
seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751. 
[13] Indians €=>32.6 
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32) 
Neither language of 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty nor 
federal trespass statute provides support for tribal 
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on land 
owned by non-Indians. Treaty With the Crow 
Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1151,1165. 
[14] Indians €^>32.6 
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32) 
Crow Indian Tribe does not have "inherent 
sovereignty" so broad as to constitute source for 
power on part of Tribe to regulate non-Indian 
hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within 
reservation. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, 
IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165. 
[15] Indians €^>32(4.1) 
209k32(4.1) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32(4), 209k32) 
In addition to power to punish tribal offenders, 
Indian tribes retain inherent power to determine 
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations 
among members, and to prescribe rules of 
inheritance for members, but exercise of tribal 
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is 
inconsistent with dependent status of the tribes and 
cannot survive without express congressional 
delegation. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, 
IV, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 
749; Indian General Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25 
U.S.C.A. § 331 et seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 
41 Stat. 751; Indian Reorganization Act, § 1 et 
seq., 25 U.S.C.A. §461 etseq. 
[16] Indians €^>32(8) 
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209k32(8) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32) 
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on their reservations, even on 
non-Indian fee lands, and tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing or other means, activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements. 
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat. 
649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Indian 
General Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25 U.S.C.A. § 
331 et seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 
751; Indian Reorganization Act, § 1 et seq., 25 
U.S.C.A. §461 etseq. 
[17] Indians €==>32(8) 
209k32(8) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32) 
Indian tribe may retain inherent power to exercise 
civil authority over conduct of non-Indians on fee 
lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, economic security or health or welfare of 
the tribe. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, 
IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165. 
**1247 Syllabus [FN*] 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United 
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. 
*544 By a tribal regulation, the Crow Tribe of 
Montana sought to prohibit hunting and fishing 
within its reservation by anyone who is not a 
member of the Tribe. Relying on its purported 
ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, on 
treaties which created its reservation, and on its 
inherent power as a sovereign, the Tribe claimed 
authority to prohibit hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers of the Tribe even on lands within the 
reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 
Montana, however, continued to assert its authority 
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians 
within the reservation. The First Treaty of Fort 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Laramie of 1851, in which the signatory tribes 
acknowledged various designated lands as their 
respective territories, specified that, by making the 
treaty, the tribes did not "surrender the privilege of 
hunting, fishing, or passing over" any of the lands in 
dispute. In 1868, the Second Treaty of Fort 
Laramie established the Crow Reservation, 
including land through which the Big Horn River 
flows, and provided that the reservation "shall be ... 
set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation" of the Tribe, and that no non-Indians 
except Government agents "shall ever be permitted 
to pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the 
reservation. To resolve the conflict between the 
Tribe and the State, the United States, proceeding in 
its own right and as fiduciary for the Tribe, filed the 
present action, seeking a declaratory judgment 
quieting title to **1248 the riverbed in the United 
States as trustee for the Tribe and establishing that 
the Tribe and the United States have sole authority 
to regulate hunting and fishing within the 
reservation, and an injunction requiring Montana to 
secure the Tribe's permission before issuing hunting 
or fishing licenses for use within the reservation. 
The District Court denied relief, but the Court of 
Appeals reversed. It held that the bed and banks of 
the river were held by the United States in trust for 
the Tribe; that the Tribe could regulate hunting and 
fishing within the reservation by nonmembers, 
except for hunting and fishing on fee lands by 
resident nonmember owners of those lands; and 
that nonmembers permitted by the Tribe to hunt or 
fish within the reservation remained subject to 
Montana's fish and game laws. 
Held: 
1. Title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to 
Montana upon *545 its admission into the 
Union, the United States not having conveyed 
beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow 
Tribe by the treaties of 1851 or 1868. As a general 
principle, the Federal Government holds lands 
under navigable waters in trust for future States, to 
be granted to such States when they enter the 
Union, and there is a strong presumption against 
conveyance of such lands by the United States. 
The 1851 treaty failed to overcome this 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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presumption, since it did not by its terms formally 
convey any land to the Indians at all. And whatever 
property rights the 1868 treaty created, its language 
is not strong enough to overcome the presumption 
against the sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed. 
Cf. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 
46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465. Moreover, the 
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the 
treaties presented no "public exigency" which 
would have required Congress to depart from its 
policy of reserving ownership of beds under 
navigable waters for the fiiture States. Pp. 
1250-1254. 
2. Although the Tribe may prohibit or regulate 
hunting or fishing by nonmembers on land 
belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States 
in trust for the Tribe, it has no power to regulate 
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land 
owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe. Pp. 
1254-1259. 
(a) The 1851 treaty nowhere suggested that 
Congress intended to grant such power to the Tribe. 
And while the 1868 treaty obligated the United 
States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on 
or passing through reservation lands used and 
occupied by the Tribe, thereby arguably conferring 
upon the Tribe authority to control fishing and 
hunting on those lands, that authority can only 
extend to land on which the Tribe exercises 
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" and 
cannot apply to subsequently alienated lands held in 
fee by non-Indians. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. 
Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 
2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667. Nor does the federal 
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which prohibits 
trespassing to hunt or fish, "augment" the Tribe's 
regulatory powers over non-Indian lands. That 
statute is limited to lands owned by Indians, held in 
trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved 
for use by Indians, and Congress deliberately 
excluded fee-patented lands from its scope. Pp. 
1254-1257 
(b) The Tribe's "inherent sovereignty" does not 
support its regulation of non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Through their original incorporation into the United 
States, as well as through specific treaties and 
statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the 
attributes of sovereignty, particularly as to the 
relations between a tribe and nonmembers of the 
tribe. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 
S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303. Exercise of tribal 
power beyond what *546 is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation. Here, regulation of 
hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Tribe on 
lands no longer owned by the Tribe bears no clear 
relationship **1249 to tribal self-government or 
internal relations. Non-Indian hunters and 
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any 
agreements or dealings with the Tribe so as to 
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And 
nothing suggests that such non-Indian hunting and 
fishing so threatened the Tribe's political or 
economic security as to justify tribal regulation. 
Pp. 1257-1259. 
9 Cir., 604 F.2d 1162, reversed and remanded. 
Urban L. Roth, Butte, Mont., for petitioners. 
Louis F. Claiborne, Washington, D. C , for 
respondent U. S. 
Thomas J. Lynaugh, Billings, Mont., for 
respondent Crow Tribe of Indians. 
*547 Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
This case concerns the sources and scope of the 
power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and 
fishing by non-Indians on lands within its 
reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 
Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of the 
Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its 
reservation and on its inherent power as a 
sovereign, the Crow Tribe of Montana claims the 
authority to prohibit all hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers of the Tribe on non-Indian property 
within reservation boundaries. We granted 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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certiorari, 445 U.S. 960, 100 S.Ct. 1645, 64 
L.Ed.2d 234 to review a decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that 
substantially upheld this claim. 
I 
The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some 
three centuries ago they migrated to what is now 
southern Montana. In the 19th century, warfare 
between the Crows and several other tribes led the 
tribes and the United States to sign the First Treaty 
of Fort Laramie of 1851, in which the *548 
signatory tribes acknowledged various designated 
lands as their respective territories. See 11 Stat. 
749 and 2 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and 
Treaties 594 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). The 
treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as 
Crow territory and, in Article 5, specified that, by 
making the treaty, the tribes did not "surrender the 
privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over" any of 
the lands in dispute. In 1868, the Second Treaty of 
Fort Laramie established a Crow Reservation of 
roughly 8 million acres, including land through 
which the Big Horn River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By 
Article II of the treaty, the United States agreed that 
the reservation "shall be ... set apart for the absolute 
and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow 
Tribe, and that no non-Indians except agents of the 
Government "shall ever be permitted to pass over, 
settle upon, or reside in" the reservation. 
Several subsequent Acts of Congress reduced the 
reservation to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. 
See 22 Stat. 42 (1882); § 31, 26 Stat. 1039-1040 
(1891); ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352 (1904); ch. 890, 50 
Stat. 884 (1937). In addition, the General 
Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and 
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751, 
authorized the issuance of patents in fee to 
individual Indian allottees within the reservation. 
Under these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land 
to a non-Indian after holding it for 25 years. 
Today, roughly 52 percent of the reservation is 
allotted to members of the Tribe and held by the 
United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in 
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximately 28 
percent is held in fee by non-Indians. The State of 
Montana owns in fee simple 2 percent of the 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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reservation, the United States less than 1 percent. 
Since the 1920's, the State of Montana has stocked 
the waters of the reservation with fish, and the 
construction of a dam by the United States made 
trout fishing in the Big Horn River possible. The 
reservation also contains game, some of it stocked 
by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal 
*549 Council has passed several resolutions 
**1250 respecting hunting and fishing on the 
reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the 
occasion for this lawsuit. That resolution prohibits 
hunting and fishing within the reservation by 
anyone who is not a member of the Tribe. The 
State of Montana, however, has continued to assert 
its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by 
non-Indians within the reservation. 
On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own right 
and as fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States 
endeavored to resolve the conflict between the 
Tribe and the State by filing the present lawsuit. 
The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory judgment 
quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in the 
United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a 
declaratory judgment establishing that the Tribe and 
the United States have sole authority to regulate 
hunting and fishing within the reservation, and (3) 
an injunction requiring Montana to secure the 
permission of the Tribe before issuing hunting or 
fishing licenses for use within the reservation. 
The District Court denied the relief sought. 457 
F.Supp. 599. In determining the ownership of the 
river, the court invoked the presumption that the 
United States does not intend to divest itself of its 
sovereign rights in navigable waters and reasoned 
that here, as in United States v. Holt State Bank, 
270 U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465, the 
language and circumstances of the relevant treaties 
were insufficient to rebut the presumption. The 
court thus concluded that the bed and banks of the 
river had remained in the ownership of the United 
States until they passed to Montana on its admission 
to the Union. As to the dispute over the regulation 
of hunting and fishing the court found that 
"[i]mplicit in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Oliphant [v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209] is the recognition 
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do 
they have the authority to regulate non-Indians 
unless so granted by an act of Congress." 457 
F.Supp., at 609. Because no treaty or Act of 
Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate 
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held 
*550 that the Tribe could not exercise such 
authority except by granting or withholding 
authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land. All 
other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and 
fishing resided concurrently in the State of Montana 
and, under 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (which makes it a 
federal offense to trespass on Indian land to hunt or 
fish without permission), the United States. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the 
District Court. 604 F.2d 1162. Relying on its 
opinion in United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 
vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676, 97 S.Ct. 
2909, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048, the appellate court held 
that, pursuant to the treaty of 1868, the bed and 
banks of the river were held by the United States in 
trust for the Tribe. Relying on the treaties of 1851 
and 1868, the court held that the Tribe could 
regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation 
by nonmembers, although the court noted that the 
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those 
nonmembers. The court also held, however, that the 
two Allotment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe of 
the authority to prohibit hunting and fishing on fee 
lands by resident non-member owners of those 
lands. Finally, the court held that non-members 
permitted by the Tribe to hunt or fish within the 
reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and 
game laws. 
n 
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part 
of their claim of power to control hunting and 
fishing on the reservation by asking us to recognize 
their title to the bed of the Big Horn River. [FN1] 
The question** 1251 is whether the United States 
*551 conveyed beneficial ownership of the 
riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the treaties of 1851 
or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in 
trust for the use and benefit of the Tribe, or whether 
the United States retained ownership of the riverbed 
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as public land which then passed to the State of 
Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw 
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 627-628, 90 
S.Ct. 1328, 1332-1333, 25 L.Ed.2d 615. 
FN1. According to the respondents, the 
Crow Tribe's interest in restricting hunting 
and fishing on the reservation focuses 
almost entirely on sports fishing and duck 
hunting in the waters and on the surface of 
the Big Horn River. The parties, the 
District Court, and the Court of Appeals 
have all assumed that ownership of the 
riverbed will largely determine the power 
to control these activities. Moreover, 
although the complaint in this case sought 
to quiet title only to the bed of the Big 
Horn River, we note the concession of the 
United States that if the bed of the river 
passed to Montana upon its admission to 
the Union, the State at the same time 
acquired ownership of the banks of the 
river as well. 
[1][2][3][4][5] Though the owners of land riparian 
to nonnavigable streams may own the adjacent 
riverbed, conveyance by the United States of land 
riparian to a navigable river carries no interest in 
the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672, 11 
S.Ct. 210, 212, 34 L.Ed. 819; Railroad Co. v. 
Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289, 19 L.Ed. 74; 33 
U.S.C. § 10; 43 U.S.C. § 931. Rather, the 
ownership of land under navigable waters is an 
incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 
367, 409-411, 10 L.Ed. 997. As a general 
principle, the Federal Government holds such lands 
in trust for future States, to be granted to such States 
when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty 
on an "equal footing" with the established States. 
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 222-223, 
229, 11 L.Ed. 565. After a State enters the Union, 
title to the land is governed by state law. The 
State's power over the beds of navigable waters 
remains subject to only one limitation: the 
paramount power of the United States to ensure that 
such waters remain free to interstate and foreign 
commerce. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, 
55 S.Ct. 610, 615, 79 L.Ed. 1267. It is now 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
Page 7 
established, however, that Congress may sometimes 
convey lands below the high-water mark of a 
navigable water, 
"[and so defeat the title of a new State,] in order 
to perform international obligations, or to effect 
the improvement of such lands for the promotion 
and convenience of commerce with foreign 
nations and among the several States, or to carry 
out other public purposes appropriate to the 
objects for which the United States hold the 
Territory." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48, 14 
S.Ct. 548, 566, 38 L.Ed. 331. 
*552 But because control over the property 
underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified 
with the sovereign power of government, United 
States v. Oregon, supra, at 14, 55 S.Ct., at 615, it 
will not be held that the United States has conveyed 
such land except because of "some international 
duty or public exigency." United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct., at 199. See 
also Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48, 14 S.Ct., at 
566. A court deciding a question of title to the bed 
of a navigable water must, therefore, begin with a 
strong presumption against conveyance by the 
United States, United States v. Oregon, supra, at 
14, 55 S.Ct, at 615, and must not infer such a 
conveyance "unless the intention was definitely 
declared or otherwise made plain," United States v. 
Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct, at 
199, or was rendered "in clear and especial words," 
Martin v. Waddell, supra, at 411, or "unless the 
claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under 
the waters of the stream," Packer v. Bird, supra, at 
672,11 S.Ct, at 212. [FN2] 
FN2. Congress was, of course, aware of 
this presumption once it was established by 
this Court. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 588, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 
1363, 51L.Ed.2d660. 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this 
Court applied these principles to reject an Indian 
Tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake. 
The lake lay wholly within the boundaries of the 
Red Lake Indian Reservation, which had been 
created by treaties entered into before Minnesota 
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joined the Union. In these treaties the United 
States promised to "set apart and withhold from 
sale, for the use of the **1252 Chippewas, a large 
tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 
1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land 
for the permanent homes" of the Indians, Treaty of 
Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165. See Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389, 22 S.Ct. 650, 656, 
46 L.Ed. 954. [FN3] The Court concluded that 
there was nothing in the treaties "which even 
approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying 
navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose 
*553 to depart from the established policy ... of 
treating such lands as held for the benefit of the 
future State." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S., at 58-59, 46 S.Ct, at 200. Rather, "[t]he 
effect of what was done was to reserve in a general 
way for the continued occupation of the Indians 
what remained of their aboriginal territory." Id, at 
58, 46 S.Ct, at 200. 
FN3. The Hitchcock decision expressly 
stated that the Red Lake Reservation was 
"a reservation within the accepted meaning 
of the term." 185 U.S., at 389, 22 S.Ct, at 
656. 
[6] [7] The Crow treaties in this case, like the 
Chippewa treaties in Holt State Bank, fail to 
overcome the established presumption that the beds 
of navigable waters remain in trust for future States 
and pass to the new States when they assume 
sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms 
formally convey any land to the Indians at all, but 
instead chiefly represented a covenant among 
several tribes which recognized specific boundaries 
for their respective territories. Treaty of Fort 
Laramie, 1851, Art. 5, 2 Kappler 594- 595. It 
referred to hunting and fishing only insofar as it 
said that the Crow Indians "do not surrender the 
privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of 
the tracts of country heretofore described," a 
statement that had no bearing on ownership of the 
riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did 
expressly convey land to the Crow Tribe. Article II 
of the treaty described the reservation land in detail 
[FN4] and stated that such land would be "set apart 
for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation 
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of the Indians herein named...." Second Treaty of 
Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat 650. 
The treaty then stated: 
FN4. "[C]ommencing where the 107th 
degree of longitude west of Greenwich 
crosses the south boundary of Montana 
Territory; thence north along said 107th 
meridian to the mid-channel of the 
Yellowstone River; thence up said 
mid-channel of the Yellowstone to the 
point where it crosses the said southern 
boundary of Montana, being the 45th 
degree of north latitude; and thence east 
along said parallel of latitude to the place 
of beginning...." Second Treaty of Fort 
Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat. 
650. 
"[T]he United States now solemnly agrees that no 
persons, except those herein designated and 
authorized to *554 do so, and except such 
officers, agents, and employes of the Government 
as may be authorized to enter upon Indian 
reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by 
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle 
upon, or reside in the territory described in this 
article for the use of said Indians...." Ibid 
Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 
treaty created, however, its language is not strong 
enough to overcome the presumption against the 
sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed. The treaty 
in no way expressly referred to the riverbed, Packer 
v. Bird, 137 U.S., at 672, 11 S.Ct, at 212, nor was 
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in 
"clear and especial words," Martin v. Waddell, 16 
Pet, at 411, or "definitely declared or otherwise 
made very plain," United States v. Holt State Bank, 
270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct, at 199. Rather, as in Holt 
, "[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a 
general way for the continued occupation of the 
Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory." 
Id., at 58, 46 S.Ct, at 200. 
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole 
right to use and occupy the reserved land, and, 
implicitly, the power to exclude others from it, the 
respondents' reliance on that provision simply begs 
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the question of the precise extent of the conveyed 
lands to which this exclusivity attaches. The mere 
fact that the bed of a **1253 navigable water lies 
within the boundaries described in the treaty does 
not make the riverbed part of the conveyed land, 
especially when there is no express reference to the 
riverbed that might overcome the presumption 
against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals' 
Finch decision, on which recognition of the Crow 
Tribe's title to the riverbed rested in this case, that 
court construed the language of exclusivity in the 
1868 treaty as granting to the Indians all the lands, 
including the riverbed, within the described 
boundaries. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d, at 
829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive 
examination. *555 As the Court of Appeals 
recognized, ibid., and as the respondents concede, 
the United States retains a navigational easement in 
the navigable waters lying within the described 
boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless 
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases 
in the 1868 treaty as "absolute and undisturbed use 
and occupation" and "no persons, except those 
herein designated ... shall ever be permitted," 
whatever they seem to mean literally, do not give 
the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the 
territory within the described boundaries. Thus, 
even if exclusivity were the same as ownership, the 
treaty language establishing this "right of 
exclusivity" could not have the meaning that the 
Court of Appeals ascribed to it. [FN5] 
FN5. In one recent case, Choctaw Nation 
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 
25 L.Ed.2d 615, this Court did construe a 
reservation grant as including the bed of a 
navigable water, and the respondents argue 
that this case resembles Choctaw Nation 
more than it resembles the established line 
of cases to which Choctaw Nation is a 
singular exception. But the finding of a 
conveyance of the riverbed in Choctaw 
Nation was based on very peculiar 
circumstances not present in this case. 
Those circumstances arose from the 
unusual history of the treaties there at 
issue, a history which formed an important 
basis of the decision. Id. at 622-628, 90 
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S.Ct, at 1330-1333. Immediately after 
the Revolutionary War, the United States 
had signed treaties of peace and protection 
with the Cherokee and Choctaw Tribes, 
reserving them lands in Georgia and 
Mississippi. In succeeding years the 
United States bought large areas of land 
from the Indians to make room for white 
settlers who were encroaching on tribal 
lands, but the Government signed new 
treaties guaranteeing that the Indians could 
live in peace on those lands not ceded. 
The United States soon betrayed that 
promise. It proposed that the Tribes be 
relocated in a newly acquired part of the 
Arkansas Territory, but the new territory 
was soon overrun by white settlers, and 
through a series of new cession agreements 
the Indians were forced to relocate farther 
and farther west. Ultimately, most of the 
Tribes' members refused to leave their 
eastern lands, doubting the reliability of 
the Government's promises of the new 
western land, but Georgia and Mississippi, 
anxious for the relocation westward so 
they could assert jurisdiction over the 
Indian lands, purported to abolish the 
Tribes and distribute the tribal lands. The 
Choctaws and Cherokees finally signed 
new treaties with the United States aimed 
at rectifying their past suffering at the 
hands of the Federal Government and the 
States. 
Under the Choctaw treaty, the United 
States promised to convey new lands west 
of the Arkansas Territory in fee simple, 
and also pledged that "no Territory or 
State shall ever have a right to pass laws 
for the government of the Choctaw Nation 
... and that no part of the land granted to 
them shall ever be embraced in any 
Territory or State." Treaty of Dancing 
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 
333-334, quoted in Choctaw Nation v. 
Oklahoma, 397 U.S., at 625, 90 S.Ct., at 
1331. In 1835, the Cherokees signed a 
treaty containing similar provisions 
granting reservation lands in fee simple 
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and promising that the tribal lands would 
not become part of any State or Territory. 
Id, at 626, 90 S.Ct, at 1332. In 
concluding that the United States had 
intended to convey the riverbed to the 
Tribes before the admission of Oklahoma 
to the Union, the Choctaw Court relied on 
these circumstances surrounding the 
treaties and placed special emphasis on the 
Government's promise that the reserved 
lands would never become part of any 
State. Id, at 634-635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336. 
Neither the special historical origins of the 
Choctaw and Cherokee treaties nor the 
crucial provisions granting Indian lands in 
fee simple and promising freedom from 
state jurisdiction in those treaties have any 
counterparts in the terms and 
circumstances of the Crow treaties of 1851 
and 1868. 
*556 Moreover, even though the establishment of 
an Indian reservation can be an "appropriate public 
purpose" within the meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S., at 48, 14 S.Ct, at 566, justifying a 
congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g., 
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 
78, 85, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed. 138, the situation of 
the Crow Indians at the time of the **1254 treaties 
presented no "public exigency" which would have 
required Congress to depart from its policy of 
reserving ownership of beds under navigable waters 
for the future States. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 
at 48, 14 S.Ct, at 566. As the record in this case 
shows, at the time of the treaty the Crows were a 
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and 
fishing was not important to their diet or way of life. 
1 App. 74. Cf, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United 
States, supra, at 88, 39 S.Ct, at 41; Skokomish 
Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d 205, 212 (CA9). 
[8] For these reasons, we conclude that title to the 
bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of 
Montana upon its *557 admission into the Union, 
and that the Court of Appeals was in error in 
holding otherwise. 
Ill 
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[9] Though the parties in this case have raised 
broad questions about the power of the Tribe to 
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the 
reservation, the regulatory issue before us is a 
narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the 
Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or 
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the 
United States in trust for the Tribe, 604 F.2d, at 
1165-1166, and with this holding we can readily 
agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals 
that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt 
on such lands, it may condition their entry by 
charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. 
Ibid. What remains is the question of the power of 
the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting 
on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of 
the Tribe. The Court of Appeals held that, with 
respect to fee-patented lands, the Tribe may 
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing 
by non-member resident owners or by those, such as 
tenants or employees, whose occupancy is 
authorized by the owners. Id, at 1169. The court 
further held that the Tribe may totally prohibit 
hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation 
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. 
Ibid 
The Court of Appeals found two sources for this 
tribal regulatory power: the Crow treaties, 
"augmented" by 18 U.S.C. § 1165, and "inherent" 
Indian sovereignty. We believe that neither source 
supports the court's conclusion. 
A 
[10] The purposes of the 1851 treaty were to assure 
safe passage for settlers across the lands of various 
Indian Tribes; to compensate the Tribes for the loss 
of buffalo, other game animals, timber, and forage; 
to delineate tribal boundaries; to promote 
intertribal peace; and to establish a way of iden 
tifying *558 Indians who committed depredations 
against non-Indians. As noted earlier, the treaty did 
not even create a reservation, although it did 
designate tribal lands. See Crow Tribe v. United 
States, 284 F.2d 361, 364, 366, 368, 151 Ct.Cl. 
281, 285-286, 289, 292-293. Only Article 5 of that 
Treaty referred to hunting and fishing, and it merely 
provided that the eight signatory tribes "do not 
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surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or 
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore 
described." 2 Kappler 595. [FN6] The treaty 
nowhere suggested that Congress intended to grant 
authority to the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers on nonmember lands. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
after the treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as 
members of other Indian tribes, undoubtedly hunted 
and fished within the treaty-designated territory of 
the Crows. 604 F.2d, at 1167. 
FN6. The complaint in this case did not 
allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing 
on reservation lands has impaired this 
privilege. 
[11][12] The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 
649, reduced the size of the Crow territory 
designated by the 1851 treaty. **1255 Article II of 
the treaty established a reservation for the Crow 
Tribe, and provided that it be "set apart for the 
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the 
Indians herein named, and for such other friendly 
tribes or individual Indians as from time to time 
they may be willing, with the consent of the United 
States, to admit amongst them ...," (emphasis 
added) and that "the United States now solemnly 
agrees that no persons, except those herein 
designated and authorized so to do ... shall ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the 
territory described in this article for the use of said 
Indians...." The treaty, therefore, obligated the 
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from 
residing on or passing through reservation lands 
used and occupied by the Tribe, and, thereby, 
arguably conferred upon the Tribe *559 the 
authority to control fishing and hunting on those 
lands. [FN7] But that authority could only extend 
to land on which the Tribe exercises "absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation." And it is clear 
that the quantity of such land was substantially 
reduced by the allotment and alienation of tribal 
lands as a result of the passage of the General 
Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 
25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq., and the Crow Allotment 
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. [FN8] If the 1868 treaty 
created tribal power to restrict or prohibit 
non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, 
that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by 
non-Indians. [FN9] 
FN7. Article IV of the treaty addressed 
hunting rights specifically. But that 
Article referred only to "unoccupied lands 
of the United States," viz., lands outside 
the reservation boundaries, and is 
accordingly not relevant here. 
FN8. The 1920 Crow Allotment Act was 
one of the special Allotment Acts Congress 
passed from time to time pursuant to the 
policy underlying the General Allotment 
Act. See S.Rep.No.219, 66th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 5 (1919). The Senate Committee 
Report on the Crow Allotment bill stated 
that it "is in accordance with the policy to 
which Congress gave its adherence many 
years ago, and which found expression in 
the [General Allotment Act]." Ibid. 
FN9. The Court of Appeals discussed the 
effect of the Allotment Acts as follows: 
"While neither of these Acts, nor any other 
to which our attention has been called, 
explicitly qualifies the Tribe's rights over 
hunting and fishing, it defies reason to 
suppose that Congress intended that 
non-members who reside on fee patent 
lands could hunt and fish thereon only by 
consent of the Tribe. So far as the record 
of this case reveals, no efforts to exclude 
completely non-members of the Crow 
Tribe from hunting and fishing within the 
reservation were being made by the Crow 
Tribe at the time of enactment of the 
Allotment Acts." 604 F.2d 1162, 1168 
(footnote omitted). 
But nothing in the Allotment Acts supports 
the view of the Court of Appeals that the 
Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and 
fishing by non-resident fee owners. The 
policy of the Acts was the eventual 
assimilation of the Indian population. 
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 
U.S. 60, 72, 82 S.Ct. 562, 569, 7 L.Ed.2d 
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573, and the "gradual extinction of Indian 
reservations and Indian titles." Draper v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246, 17 S.Ct. 
107, 109, 41 L.Ed. 419. The Secretary of 
the Interior and the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs repeatedly emphasized that 
the allotment policy was designed to 
eventually eliminate tribal relations. See, 
e. g., Secretary of the Interior Ann.Rep., 
vol. 1, pp. 25-28 (1885); Secretary of the 
Interior Ann.Rep., vol 1, p. 4 (1886); 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann.Rep., 
vol. 1, pp. IV-X (1887); Secretary of the 
Interior Ann.Rep., vol. 1, pp. 
XXIX-XXXII (1888); Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Ann.Rep. 3-4 (1889); 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann.Rep. 
VI, XXXIX (1890); Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Ann.Rep., vol. 1, pp. 3-9, 26 
(1891); Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Ann.Rep. 5 (1892); Secretary of the 
Interior Ann.Rep., vol. 1, p. IV (1894). 
And throughout the congressional debates 
on the subject of allotment, it was assumed 
that the "civilization" of the Indian 
population was to be accomplished, in 
part, by the dissolution of tribal relations. 
See, e. g, 11 Cong.Rec. 779 (Sen. Vest), 
782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784 (Sen. Saunders), 
875 (Sens. Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. 
Brown), 905 (Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. 
Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. 
Hoar), 1064, 1065 (Sen. Plumb), 1067 
(Sen. Williams) (1881). 
There is simply no suggestion in the 
legislative history that Congress intended 
that the non-Indians who would settle upon 
alienated allotted lands would be subject to 
tribal regulatory authority. Indeed, 
throughout the congressional debates, 
allotment of Indian land was consistently 
equated with the dissolution of tribal 
affairs and jurisdiction. See, e. g, id, at 
Cong.Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen. 
Hoar), 876 (Sen. Morgan), 878 (Sens. 
Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Brown), 908 
(Sen. Call), 939 (Sen. Teller), 1028 (Sen. 
Hoar), 1067 (Sens. Edmunds and 
Williams). It defies common sense to 
suppose that Congress would intend that 
non-Indians purchasing allotted lands 
would become subject to tribal jurisdiction 
when an avowed purpose of the allotment 
policy was the ultimate destruction of 
tribal government. And it is hardly likely 
that Congress could have imagined that the 
purpose of peaceful assimilation could be 
advanced if fee-holders could be excluded 
from fishing or hunting on their acquired 
property. 
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus 
reservation land was, of course, repudiated 
in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 
48 Stat. 984, at 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. 
But what is relevant in this case is the 
effect of the land alienation occasioned by 
that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to 
Indian use and occupation of reservation 
land. 
**1256 [13] *560 In Puyallup Tribe v. 
Washington Game Dept, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 
2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (Puyallup III ), the relevant 
treaty included language virtually identical to that in 
the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The Puyallup 
Reservation was to be "set apart, and, so far *561 as 
necessary, surveyed and marked out for their 
exclusive use ... [and no] white man [was to] be 
permitted to reside upon the same without 
permission of the tribe...." See/a?., at 174, 97 S.Ct, 
at 2622. The Puyallup Tribe argued that those 
words amounted to a grant of authority to fish free 
of state interference. But this Court rejected that 
argument, finding, in part, that it "clashe[d] with the 
subsequent history of the reservation ...," ibid, 
notably two Acts of Congress under which the 
Puyallups alienated, in fee simple, the great 
majority of the lands in the reservation, including 
all the land abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, 
"[n]either the Tribe nor its members continue to 
hold Puyallup River fishing grounds for their 
'exclusive use.' " Ibid. Puyallup III indicates, 
therefore, that treaty rights with respect to 
reservation lands must be read in light of the 
subsequent alienation of those lands. Accordingly, 
the language of the 1868 treaty provides no support 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
V»-H-r>.//r>*^+ ^ r ^ o + l o ^ r r>^t-n lA&Y^Tcmj Vi+ml9/ : l^ct=Cit^^frxrmc»t=TJTTV/fT T?Rr t\*\>x\Az=z A Ci(\R^Sl(\(\C\C\ no/i^nnn^ 
101 S.Ct. 1245 
450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245) 
Page 13 
for tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing 
on land owned by non-Indians. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal 
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, somehow 
"augmented" the Tribe's regulatory powers over 
non-Indian land. 604 F.2d, at 1167. If anything, 
however, that statute suggests the absence of such 
authority, since Congress deliberately excluded 
fee-patented lands from the statute's scope. The 
statute provides: 
"Whoever, without lawful authority or 
permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon 
any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian 
tribe, band, or group and either are held by the 
United States in trust or are subject to a 
restriction against alienation imposed by the 
United States, or upon any lands of the United 
States that are reserved for Indian use, for the 
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, 
or for the removal of game, peltries, or fish 
therefrom, shall be fined ...." 
The statute is thus limited to lands owned 
by Indians, held in trust by the United 
States for Indians, or reserved for use *562 
by Indians. [FN 10] If Congress had 
wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands 
owned by non-Indians, it could easily have 
done so by incorporating in § 1165 the 
definition of "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151: "all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, 
and including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation." Indeed, a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary proposed that this be done. 
But the Department of the Interior 
recommended against doing so in a letter 
dated May 23, 1958. The Department 
pointed out that a previous congressional 
Report, H.R.Rep.No.2593, 85th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1958), [FN11] had made clear that 
the bill **1257 contained no implication 
that it would apply to land other than that 
held or controlled by Indians or the United 
States. [FN 12] *563 The Committee on 
the Judiciary then adopted the present 
language, which does not reach 
fee-patented lands within the boundaries of 
an Indian reservation. 
FN 10. See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F.Supp. 
1316, 1336 (W D Wis.); United States v. Pollmann 
, 364 F.Supp. 995 (D C Mont.). 
FN11. House Report No.2593 stated that 
the purpose of the bill that became 18 
U.S.C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to 
enter Indian land to hunt, trap, or fish 
without the consent of the individual 
Indian or tribe: 
"Indian property owners should have the 
same protection as other property owners, 
for example, a private hunting club may 
keep nonmembers off its game lands or it 
may issue a permit for a fee. One who 
comes on such lands without permission 
may be prosecuted under State law but a 
non-Indian trespasser on an Indian 
reservation enjoys immunity. 
"Non-Indians are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot be 
tried in Indian courts on trespass charges. 
Further, there are no Federal laws which 
can be invoked against trespassers." 
H.R.Rep.No.2593, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 
2. 
FN 12. Subsequent Reports in the House 
and Senate, H.R.Rep.No.625, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1959); S.Rep.No.1686, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), also refer to 
"Indian lands" and "Indian property 
owners" rather than "Indian country." In 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209, 
this Court referred to S.Rep.No.1686, 
which stated that "the legislation [18 
U.S.C. § 1165] will give to the Indian 
tribes and to individual Indian owners 
certain rights that now exist as to others, 
and fills a gap in the present law for the 
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protection of their property'' 435 U.S., at 
206, 98 S.Ct, at 1019. (Emphasis added.) 
Before the Court of Appeals decision, 
several other courts interpreted § 1165 to 
be confined to lands owned by Indians, or 
held in trust for their benefit. State v. 
Baker, 464 F.Supp. 1377 (W D Wis.); 
United States v. Bouchard, 464 F.Supp. 
1316 (W D Wis.); United States v. 
Pollmann, supra; Donahue v. California 
Justice Court, 15 Cal.App.3d 557, 93 
Cal.Rptr. 310. Cf. United States v. 
Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085, 1089(CA9) 
(holding that § 1165 was designed to 
prevent encroachments on Indian lands, 
rejecting the argument that § 1 165 makes 
illegal the unauthorized killing of wildlife 
on an Indian reservation, and noting that 
"the application of Montana game laws to 
the activities of non-Indians on Indian 
reservations does not interfere with tribal 
self-government on reservations). 
B 
[14] Beyond relying on the Crow treaties and 18 
U.S.C. § 1 165 as source for the Tribe's power to 
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on 
non-Indian lands within the reservation, the Court 
of Appeals also identified that power as an incident 
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the 
entire Crow Reservation. 604 F.2d, at 1170. But 
"inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to support 
the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to 
non-Indian lands. 
This Court most recently reviewed the principles of 
inherent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303. In 
that case, noting that Indian tribes are "unique 
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty 
over both their members and their territory," id, at 
323, 98 S.Ct., at 1086, the Court upheld the power 
of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate 
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to 
note that, through their original incorporation into 
the United States as well as through specific treaties 
and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the 
attributes of sovereignty. *564Id, at 326, 98 
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S.Ct., at 1087. The Court distinguished between 
those inherent powers retained by the tribes and 
those divested: 
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are 
those involving the relations between an Indian 
tribe and nonmembers of the tribe .... 
These limitations rest on the fact that the 
dependent status of Indian tribes within our 
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent 
with their freedom independently to determine 
their external relations. But the powers of 
self-government, including the power to prescribe 
and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a 
different type. They involve only the relations 
among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not 
such powers as would necessarily be lost by 
virtue of a tribe's dependent status." Ibid. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[15] Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal 
offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent 
power to determine tribal membership, to regulate 
domestic relations among members, and to 
prescribe rules of inheritance for members. **1258 
Id., at 322, n. 18, 98 S.Ct., at 1085, n. 18. But 
exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation. Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 
36 L.Ed.2d 114; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 
219-220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251; United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381- 382, 6 S.Ct. 
1109, 1112-1113, 30 L.Ed. 228; see McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 
93 S.Ct. 1257, 1261, 36 L.Ed.2d 129. Since 
regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of 
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears 
no clear relationship to tribal self-government or 
internal relations, [FN 13] *565 the general 
principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not 
authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 
74-05. 
FN13. Any argument that Resolution No. 
74-05 is necessary to Crow tribal 
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self-government is refuted by the findings 
of the District Court that the State of 
Montana has traditionally exercised "near 
exclusive" jurisdiction over hunting and 
fishing on fee lands within the reservation, 
and that the parties to this case had 
accommodated themselves to the state 
regulation. 457 F.Supp. 599, 610. The 
Court of Appeals left these findings 
unaltered and indeed implicitly reaffirmed 
them, adding that the record reveals no 
attempts by the Tribe at the time of the 
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian 
hunting and fishing on reservation lands. 
604 F.2d, at 1168, and n. 11 A. 
[16] [17] The Court recently applied these general 
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209, 
rejecting a tribal claim of inherent sovereign 
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot 
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished 
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice 
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. 
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162-the first 
Indian case to reach this Court— that the Indian 
tribes have lost any "right of governing every 
person within their limits except themselves." 435 
U.S., at 209, 98 S.Ct, at 1021. Though Oliphant 
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal 
matters, [FN14] the principles on which it relied 
support the general proposition that the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to 
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be 
sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power 
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on their reservations, even on 
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements. Williams v. Lee, supra, at 223, 79 
S.Ct., at 272; Morris v. Hitchcock, *566194 U.S. 
384, 24 S.Ct. 712, 48 L.Ed. 1030; Buster v. Wright, 
135 F. 947, 950 (CA8); see Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 152-154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2080-2082, 
65 L.Ed.2d 10. A tribe may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v. 
District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, 96 S.Ct. 943, 
946, 47 L.Ed.2d 106; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 
220, 79 S.Ct., at 270; Montana Catholic Missions 
v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-129, 26 
S.Ct. 197, 200-201, 50 L.Ed. 398; Thomas v. Gay, 
169 U.S. 264, 273, 18 S.Ct. 340, 343, 42 L.Ed. 740. 
[FN15] 
FN 14. By denying the Suquamish Tribe 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
however, the Oliphant case would 
seriously restrict the ability of a tribe to 
enforce any purported regulation of 
non-Indian hunters and fishermen. 
Moreover, a tribe would not be able to rely 
for enforcement on the federal criminal 
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, since 
that statute does not apply to fee patented 
lands. See supra, at 1256-1257, and nn. 
10-12. 
FN15. As a corollary, this Court has held 
that Indian tribes retain rights to river 
waters necessary to make their reservations 
livable. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546, 599, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 1497, 10 L.Ed.2d 
542. 
**1259 No such circumstances, however, are 
involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and 
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any 
agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to 
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And 
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian 
hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political 
or economic security as to justify tribal regulation. 
The complaint in the District Court did not allege 
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands 
imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe. 
[FN 16] Furthermore, the District Court made 
express findings, left unaltered by the Court of 
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Appeals, that the Crow Tribe has traditionally 
accommodated itself to the State's "near exclusive" 
regulation of hunting and fishing on fee lands within 
the reservation. 457 F.Supp., at 609-610. And the 
District Court found that Montana's statutory and 
regulatory scheme does not prevent the Crow Tribe 
from limiting *567 or forbidding non-Indian 
hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held 
in trust for the Tribe or its members. Id, at 609. 
FN 16. Similarly, the complaint did not 
allege that the State has abdicated or 
abused its responsibility for protecting and 
managing wildlife, has established its 
season, bag, or creel limits in such a way 
as to impair the Crow Indians' treaty rights 
to fish or hunt, or has imposed less 
stringent hunting and fishing regulations 
within the reservation than in other parts of 
the State. Cf. United States v. Washington 
, 384 F.Supp. 312, 410-411 (W D Wash.), 
aff d, 520 F.2d 676 (CA9). 
IV 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
*569 Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice 
BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, 
dissenting in part. 
Only two years ago, this Court reaffirmed that the 
terms of a treaty between the United States and an 
Indian tribe must be construed " 'in the sense in 
which they would naturally be understood by the 
Indians.' " Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 
U.S. 658, 676, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3070, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 
(1979), quoting from Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 
11, 20 S.Ct. 1, 5, 44 L.Ed. 49 (1899). In holding 
today that the bed of the Big Horn River passed to 
the State of Montana upon its admission to the 
Union, the Court disregards this settled rule of 
statutory construction. Because I believe that the 
United States intended, and the Crow Nation 
understood, that the bed of the Big Horn was to 
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No 
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belong to the Crow Indians, I dissent from so much 
of the Court's opinion as holds otherwise. [FN1] 
FN1. While the complaint in this case 
sought to quiet title only to the bed of the 
Big Horn River, see ante at 1250, n. 1, I 
think it plain that if the bed of the river was 
reserved to the Crow Indians before 
statehood, so also were the banks up to the 
high-water mark. 
I 
As in any case involving the construction of a 
treaty, it is necessary at the outset to determine what 
the parties intended. *570 Washington v. Fishing 
Vessel Assn., 443 U.S., at 675, 99 S.Ct, at 3069. 
With respect to an Indian treaty, the Court has said 
that "the United States, as the party with the 
presumptively superior negotiating skills and 
superior knowledge of the language in which the 
treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid 
taking advantage of the other side." Id, at 675-676, 
99 S.Ct, at 3069-3070. Obviously, this rule is 
applicable here. But before determining what the 
Crow Indians must have understood the Treaties of 
Fort Laramie to mean, it is appropriate to ask what 
the United States intended, for our inquiry need go 
no further if the United States meant to convey the 
bed of the Big Horn River to the Indians. 
The Court concedes that the establishment of an 
Indian reservation can be an "appropriate public 
purpose" justifying a **1260 congressional 
conveyance of a riverbed. Ante, at 1253. It holds, 
however, that no such public purpose or exigency 
could have existed here, since at the time of the Fort 
Laramie Treaties the Crow were a nomadic tribe 
dependent chiefly upon buffalo, and fishing was not 
important to their diet or way of life. Ibid. The 
factual premise upon which the Court bases its 
conclusion is open to serious question: while the 
District Court found that fish were not "a central 
part of the Crow diet," 457 F.Supp. 599, 602 
(Mont. 1978), there was evidence at trial that the 
Crow ate fish both as a supplement to their buffalo 
diet and as a substitute for meat in time of scarcity. 
[FN2] 
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FN2. See 1 App. 39-40 (testimony of Joe 
Medicine Crow, Tribal Historian). See 
also id, at 90, 97 (testimony of Henry Old 
Coyote). Thus, while one historian has 
stated that "I have never met a reference to 
eating of fish" by the Crow Indians, R. 
Lowie, The Crow Indians 72 (1935), it is 
clear that such references do exist. See 
457 F.Supp., at 602. See also n. 7, infra. 
Even if it were true that fishing was not important 
to the Crow Indians at the time the Fort Laramie 
Treaties came into being, it does not necessarily 
follow that there was no public purpose or exigency 
that could have led Congress to *571 convey the 
riverbed to the Crow. Indeed, history informs us 
that the very opposite was true. In negotiating 
these treaties, the United States was actuated by two 
somewhat conflicting purposes: the desire to 
provide for the Crow Indians, and the desire to 
obtain the cession of all Crow territory not within 
the ultimate reservation's boundaries. Retention of 
ownership of the riverbed for the benefit of the 
future State of Montana would have been 
inconsistent with each of these purposes. 
First: It was the intent of the United States that the 
Crow Indians be converted from a nomadic, hunting 
tribe to a settled, agricultural people. [FN3] The 
Treaty of Fort Laramie of Sept. 17, 1851, see 11 
Stat. 749, and 2 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws 
and Treaties 594 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler), was 
precipitated by the depletion of game, timber, and 
forage by the constantly increasing number of 
settlers who crossed the lands of the Plains Indians 
on their way to California. Aggrieved by these 
depredations, the Indians had opposed that passage, 
sometimes by force. [FN4] In order to ensure safe 
passage for the settlers, the United States in 1851 
called together at Fort Laramie eight Indian 
Nations, including the Crow. The pronouncement 
made at that time by the United States 
Commissioner emphasized the Government's 
concern over the destruction of the game upon 
which the Indians depended. [FN5] The treaty's 
Art. 5, which set specified *572 boundaries for the 
Indian Nations, explicitly provided that the 
signatory tribes "do not surrender the privilege of 
hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts" 
described in the treaty, 2 Kappler, at 595 (emphasis 
added), and, further, its Art. 7 stated that the United 
States would provide an annuity in the form of 
"provisions, merchandise, domestic animals, and 
agricultural implements." Ibid. 
FN3. See generally United States v. Sioux 
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 380, n. 
11, 100 S.Ct. 2716, 2722, n. 11, 65 
L.Ed.2d 844 (1980) (discussing federal 
reservation policy). 
FN4. The history of the events leading up 
to the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 is 
recounted in detail in Crow Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 281, 
284 F.2d 361 (1960), cert, denied, 366 
U.S. 924, 81 S.Ct. 1350, 6 L.Ed.2d 383 
(1961); Crow Nation v. United States, 81 
CtCl. 238 (1935); and Fort Berthold 
Indians v. United States, 71 Ct.Cl. 308 
(1930). 
FN5. According to an account published in 
the Saint Louis Republican, Oct. 26, 1851, 
Treaty Commissioner Mitchell stated: 
"The ears of your Great Father are always 
open to the complaints of his Red 
Children. He has heard and is aware that 
your buffalo and game are driven off and 
your grass and timber consumed by the 
opening of roads and the passing of 
emigrants through your countries. For 
these losses he desires to compensate you." 
Quoted in Crow Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 151 Ct.Cl., at 290, 284 
F.2d, at 366. 
The same concern was expressed in 
internal communications of the 
Government. See, e. g, id, at 287-288, 
284 F.2d, at 365 (letter of W. Medill, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the 
Secretary of the Interior). 
**1261 The intent of the United States to provide 
alternative means of subsistence for the Plains 
Indians is demonstrated even more clearly by the 
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subsequent Fort Laramie Treaty of May 7, 1868, 
between the United States and the Crow Nation. 
15 Stat. 649. United States Commissioner Taylor, 
who met with the Crow Indians in 1867, had 
acknowledged to them that the game upon which 
they relied was "fast disappearing," and had stated 
that the United States proposed to furnish them with 
"homes and cattle, to enable you to begin to raise a 
supply or stock with which to support your families 
when the game has disappeared." [FN6] 
Proceedings of the Great Peace Commission of 
1867- 1868, pp. 86-87 (Institute for the 
Development of Indian Law (1975)) (hereinafter 
Proceedings). Given this clear recognition by the 
United States that the traditional mainstay of the 
Crow Indians' diet was disappearing, it is 
inconceivable that the United States intended by the 
1868 treaty to deprive the Crow of "potential 
control over a source of food on their *573 
reservation." [FN7] United States v. Finch, 548 
F.2d 822, 832 (CA9 1976), vacated on other 
grounds, 433 U.S. 676, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 53 L.Ed.2d 
1048 (1977). See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. 
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed. 
138(1918). [FN8] 
FN6. The 1868 treaty provided that 
members of the Crow Tribe who 
commenced farming would be allotted 
land and given agricultural supplies; it also 
provided that subsistence rations for a 
period of four years would be supplied to 
every Indian who agreed to settle on the 
reservation. See Arts. VI, VIII, and IX of 
the treaty, 15 Stat. 650-652. 
FN7. It is significant that in 1873 the 
United States Commissioners who sought 
to negotiate a further diminishment of the 
Crow Reservation were instructed by the 
very Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 321, 17 Stat. 
626, that "if there is upon such reservation 
a locality where fishing could be valuable 
to the Indians, [they should] include the 
same [in the diminished reservation] if 
practicable...." 
That those fishing rights would have been 
valuable to the Crow Indians is suggested 
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by the statement of Chief Blackfoot at the 
1867 Fort Laramie Conference: 
"There is plenty of buffalo, deer, elk, and 
antelope in my country. There is plenty of 
beaver in all the streams. There is plenty 
offish too. I never yet heard of any of the 
Crow Nation dying of starvation. I know 
that the game is fast decreasing, and 
whenever it gets scarce, I will tell my 
Great Father. That will be time enough to 
go farming." Proceedings, at 91. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Edwin Thompson Denig, a white fur trader 
who resided in Crow territory from 
approximately 1833 until 1856, also 
remarked: 
"Every creek and river teems with beaver, 
and good fish and fowl can be had at any 
stream in the proper season." E. Denig, 
Of the Crow Nation 21 (1980). 
FN8. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries, the 
United States sued to enjoin a commercial 
fishing company from maintaining a fish 
trap in navigable waters off the Annette 
Islands in Alaska, which had been set aside 
for the Metlakahtla Indians. The lower 
courts granted the relief sought, and this 
Court affirmed. The Court noted: "That 
Congress had power to make the 
reservation inclusive of the adjacent waters 
and submerged land as well as the upland 
needs little more than statement." 248 
U.S., at 87, 39 S.Ct, at 41. This was 
because the reservation was a setting aside 
of public property "for a recognized public 
purpose-that of safe-guarding and 
advancing a dependent Indian people 
dwelling within the United States." Id, at 
88, 39 S.Ct., at 41. The Court observed 
that "[t]he Indians naturally looked on the 
fishing grounds as part of the islands," and 
it found further support for its conclusion 
"in the general rule that statutes passed for 
the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or 
communities are to be liberally construed, 
doubtful expressions being resolved in 
favor of the Indians." Id, at 89, 39 S.Ct, 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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at 42. 
Second: The establishment of the Crow 
Reservation was *574 necessitated by the same 
"public purpose" or "exigency" that led to the 
creation of the Choctaw and Cherokee Reservations 
discussed in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 
U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 25 L.Ed.2d 615 (1970). 
In both cases, Congress responded to pressure for 
Indian land by establishing reservations in return for 
the Indians' relinquishment of their claims to other 
territories. [FN9] Just as the Choctaws **1262 and 
the Cherokees received their reservation in fee 
simple " 'to inure to them while they shall exist as a 
nation and live on it,' " id, at 625, 90 S.Ct., at 1331, 
so the Crow were assured in 1867 that they would 
receive "a tract of your country as a home for 
yourselves and children forever, upon which your 
great Father will not permit the white man to 
trespass." Proceedings, at 86. Indeed, during the 
negotiations of both the 1851 and 1868 Treaties of 
Fort Laramie the United States repeatedly referred 
to the land as belonging to the Indians, and the 
treaties reflect this understanding. [FN 10] *575 
Finally, like the Cherokee Reservation, see 397 
U.S., at 628, the Crow Reservation created by Art. 
II of the 1868 treaty consisted of "one undivided 
tract of land described merely by exterior metes and 
bounds." 15 Stat. 650. 
FN9. That the Choctaws and Cherokees 
were forced to leave their original 
homeland entirely, while the Crow were 
forced to accept repeated diminishments of 
their territory, does not distinguish 
Choctaw Nation from this case; indeed, if 
anything, that distinction suggests that the 
Crow Indians would have had an even 
greater expectancy than did the Choctaws 
and Cherokees that the rivers encompassed 
by their reservation would continue to 
belong to them. The "public purpose" 
behind the creation of these reservations in 
each case was the same: "to provide room 
for the increasing numbers of new settlers 
who were encroaching upon Indian lands 
during their westward migrations." 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S., at 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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623, 90 S.Ct, at 1330. While the Fort 
Laramie Treaty of 1851 may have been 
designed primarily to assure safe passage 
for settlers crossing Indian lands, by 1868 
settlers and miners were remaining in 
Montana. See N. Plummer, Crow Indians 
109-114 (1974). Accordingly, whereas 
the signatory tribes, by Art. 5 of the 1851 
treaty did not "abandon or prejudice any 
rights or claims they may have to other 
lands," see 2 Kappler, at 595, by Art. II of 
the 1868 treaty the Crow Indians 
"relinquish [ed] all title, claims, or rights in 
and to any portion of the territory of the 
United States, except such as is embraced 
within the [reservation] limits aforesaid." 
15 Stat. 650. 
FN 10. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 151 Ct.CL, at 288-291, 284 
F.2d at 365-367; Proceedings, at 86. The 
Court suggests that the 1851 treaty was 
simply "a covenant among several tribes 
which recognized specific boundaries for 
their respective territories." Ante, at 1252. 
But this interpretation of the treaty 
consistently has been rejected by the Court 
of Claims, which has held that the treaty 
recognized title in the signatory Indian 
Nations. See Crow Tribe of Indians, 151 
CLCL, at 291, 284 F.2d, at 367; Crow 
Nation v. United States, 81 Ct.CL, at 
271-272; Fort Berthold Indians v. United 
States, 71 Ct.CL 308 (1930). Further, the 
Court's interpretation is contrary to the 
analysis of the 1851 treaty made in 
Shoshone Indians v. United States,324 
U.S. 335, 349, 65 S.Ct. 690, 697, 89 L.Ed. 
985 (1945) ("the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the Fort 
Laramie treaty [of 1851] indicate a 
purpose to recognize the Indian title to the 
lands described"). 
In any event, as the Court concedes, ante, 
at 1252, it is beyond dispute that the 1868 
treaty set apart a reservation "for the 
absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation" of the Crow Indians. Cf. 
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United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 
448 U.S., at 374-376, 100 S.Ct, at 
2719-2721 (discussing the similar 
provisions of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 
April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, between the 
United States and the Sioux Nation). 
Since essentially the same "public purpose" led to 
the creation of both reservations, it is highly 
appropriate that the analysis of Choctaw Nation be 
applied in this case. As the State of Montana does 
here, the State of Oklahoma in Choctaw Nation 
claimed a riverbed that was surrounded on both 
sides by lands granted to an Indian tribe. This 
Court in Choctaw Nation found Oklahoma's claim 
to be "at the least strained," and held that all the 
land inside the reservation's exterior metes and 
bounds, including the riverbed, "seems clearly 
encompassed within the grant." even though no 
mention had been made of the bed. 397 U.S., at 
628, 90 S.Ct, at 1333. The Court found that the 
"natural inference" to be drawn from the grants to 
the Choctaws and Cherokees was that "all the land 
within their metes and bounds was conveyed, 
including the banks and bed of rivers." Id, at 634, 
90 S.Ct, at 1336. See also Donnelly v. United 
States, 228 U.S. 243, 259, 33 S.Ct. 449, 453, 57 
L.Ed. 820 (1913). The *576 Court offers no 
plausible explanation for its failure to draw the 
same "natural inference" here. [FN 11] 
FN11. As noted above, neither the "special 
historical origins" of the Choctaw and 
Cherokee treaties, nor the provisions of 
those treaties granting Indian lands in fee 
simple, serve to distinguish this case from 
Choctaw Nation. Equally unpersuasive is 
the suggestion that in Choctaw the Court 
placed "special emphasis on the 
Government's promise that the reserved 
lands would never become part of any 
State." Ante, at 1253, n. 5. Rather than 
placing "special emphasis" on this 
promise, the Choctaw Court indicated only 
that the promise reinforced the conclusion 
that the Court drew from an analysis of the 
language of conveyance contained in the 
treaties. 397 U.S., at 635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336 
**1263 In Choctaw Nation, the State of Oklahoma 
also laid claim to a portion of the Arkansas River at 
the border of the Indian reservation. The Court's 
analysis of that claim lends weight to the conclusion 
that the bed of the Big Horn belongs to the Crow 
Indians. Interpreting the treaty language setting the 
boundary of the Cherokee Reservation "down the 
main channel of the Arkansas river," the Choctaw 
Court noted that such language repeatedly has been 
held to convey title to the midpoint of the channel, 
relying on Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United 
States, 260 U.S. 77, 43 S.Ct. 60, 67 L.Ed. 140 
(1922). [FN12] 397 U.S., at 631-633, 90 S.Ct, at 
1334-1335. Here, Art. II of the 1868 Treaty of 
*577 Fort Laramie established the boundary of the 
Crow Reservation as running in part up the 
"mid-channel of the Yellowstone river." 15 Stat. 
650. Thus, under Brewer-Elliott and Choctaw 
Nation, it is clear that the United States intended to 
grant the Crow the bed of the Yellowstone to the 
mid-point of the channel; it follows a fortiori that it 
was the intention of the United States to grant the 
Crow Indians the bed of that portion of the Big 
Horn that was totally encompassed by the 
reservation. [FN 13] 
FN12. In Brewer-Elliott, the United States 
established a reservation for the Osage 
Indians that was bounded on one side "by 
... the main channel of the Arkansas river." 
260 U.S., at 81, 43 S.Ct, at 62. This 
Court held that the portion of the Arkansas 
River in question was nonnavigable and 
that "the title of the Osages as granted 
certainly included the bed of the river as 
far as the main channel, because the words 
of the grant expressly carry the title to that 
liner Id, at 87, 43 S.Ct, at 64 (Emphasis 
added). While the Court purported to 
reserve the question whether vesting 
ownership of the riverbed in the Osage 
Indians would have constituted an 
appropriate "public purpose" within the 
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 
14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894), if the 
stream had been navigable, that question 
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essentially had been resolved four years 
earlier in Alaska Pacific Fisheries. See n. 
8, supra. In any event, Choctaw Nation 
clearly holds, and the Court concedes, ante 
, at 1253, that the establishment of an 
Indian reservation can be an "appropriate 
public purpose" within the meaning of 
Shively v. Bowlby. 
FN13. Later events confirm this 
conclusion. In 1891, the Crow Indians 
made a further cession of territory. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 31, 26 Stat. 1040. 
This cession was bounded in part by the 
Big Horn River. Significantly, the Act, 
described the boundary of the cession as 
the "mid-channel" of the river; that 
language necessarily indicates that the 
Crow owned the entire bed of the Big 
Horn prior to the cession, and that by the 
Act they were ceding half the bed in the 
affected stretch of the river, while retaining 
the other half in that stretch and the whole 
of the bed in the portion of the river that 
remained surrounded by their lands. 
II 
But even assuming, arguendo, that the United 
States intended to retain title to the bed of the Big 
Horn River for the benefit of the future State of 
Montana, it defies common sense to suggest that the 
Crow Indians would have so understood the terms 
of the Fort Laramie Treaties. [FN 14] In negotiating 
the 1851 treaty, the United States repeatedly 
referred to the territories at issue as "your country," 
as "your land," and as "your territory." See Crow 
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 281, 
287-291, 284 F.2d 361, 364-367 (1960). Further, 
in Art. 3 of the treaty itself the Government 
undertook to protect the signatory tribes "against 
the commission of all depredations by the people of 
the said United States," and to compensate the 
tribes for any damages *578 they suffered thereby; 
in return, in Art. 2, the United States received the 
right to build roads and military posts on the 
Indians' territories. 2 Kappler, at 594. 
FN 14. Counsel for the State of Montana 
acknowledged at oral argument that the 
Crow Indians did not understand the 
meaning of the equal-footing doctrine at 
the times they entered into the Fort 
Laramie Treaties. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. 
The history of the treaty of 1868 is even more 
telling. By this time, whites were no longer simply 
passing through the Indian territories on their way 
to California. Instead, in the words of United 
States Commissioner Taylor, who addressed the 
Crow representatives gathered at Fort Laramie in 
1867: 
"We learn that valuable mines have been 
discovered in your country which in some 
instances are taken possession of by the whites. 
We learn that roads are laid out and travelled 
through your land, that settlements have been 
made upon your **1264 lands, that your game is 
being driven away and is fast disappearing. We 
know also that the white people are rapidly 
increasing and are taking possession of and 
occupying all the valuable lands. Under these 
circumstances we are sent by the great Father and 
the Great Council in Washington to arrange some 
plan to relieve you, as far as possible, from the 
bad consequences of this state of things and to 
protect you from future difficulties." 
Proceedings, at 86. (Emphasis added.) 
It is hardly credible that the Crow Indians who 
heard this declaration would have understood that 
the United States meant to retain the ownership of 
the riverbed that ran through the very heart of the 
land the United States promised to set aside for the 
Indians and their children "forever." Indeed, Chief 
Blackfoot, when addressed by Commissioner 
Taylor, responded: "The Crows used to own all this 
Country including all the rivers of the West." Id, at 
88. (Emphasis added.) The conclusion is 
inescapable that the Crow Indians understood that 
they retained the ownership of at least those rivers 
within the metes and bounds of the reservation *579 
granted them. [FN 15] This understanding could 
only have been strengthened by the reference in the 
1868 treaty to the mid-channel of the Yellowstone 
River as part of the boundary of the reservation; the 
most likely interpretation that the Crow could have 
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placed on that reference is that half the Yellowstone 
belonged to them, and it is likely that they 
accordingly deduced that all of the rivers within the 
boundary of the reservation belonged to them. 
FN 15. Statements made by Chief 
Blackfoot during the treaty negotiations of 
1873 buttress this conclusion. See, e. g, 3 
App. 136 ("The Great Spirit made these 
mountains and rivers for us, and all this 
land"); id, at 171 ("On the other side of 
the river all those streams belong to the 
Crows"). 
In fact, any other conclusion would lead to absurd 
results. Gold had been discovered in Montana in 
1858, and sluicing operations had begun on a 
stream in western Montana in 1862; hundreds of 
prospectors were lured there by this news, and some 
penetrated Crow territory. N. Plummer, Crow 
Indians 109-110 (1974). As noted, Commissioner 
Taylor remarked in 1867 that whites were mining in 
Indian territory, and he specifically indicated that 
the United States intended to protect the Indians 
from such intrusions. Yet the result reached by the 
Court today indicates that Montana or its licensees 
would have been free to enter upon the Big Horn 
River for the purpose of removing minerals from its 
bed or banks; farther, in the Court's view, they 
remain free to do so in the future. The Court's 
answer to a similar claim made by the State of 
Oklahoma in Choctaw Nation is frilly applicable 
here: "We do not believe that [the Indians] would 
have considered that they could have been 
precluded from exercising these basic ownership 
rights to the river bed, and we think it very unlikely 
that the United States intended otherwise." [FN 16] 
397 U.S., at 635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336. 
FN 16. The Court suggests that the fact the 
United States retained a navigational 
easement in the Big Horn River indicates 
that the 1868 treaty could not have granted 
the Crow the exclusive right to occupy all 
the territory within the reservation 
boundary. Ante, at 1253. But the 
retention of a navigational easement 
obviously does not preclude a finding that 
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the United States meant to convey the land 
beneath the navigable water. See, e. g. 
Choctaw Nation, supra; Alaska Pacific 
Fisheries, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 
L.Ed. 138(1918). 
*580 III 
In Choctaw Nation, the Court was confronted with 
a claim almost identical to that made by the State of 
Montana in this case. There, as here, the argument 
was made that the silence of the treaties in question 
with regard to the ownership of the disputed 
riverbeds was fatal to the Indians' case. In both 
cases, the state claimant placed its principal reliance 
on this Court's statement in United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 46 S.Ct. 197, 199, 70 
L.Ed. 465 (1926), that the conveyance of a riverbed 
"should not be regarded as intended unless the 
intention was definitely declared or otherwise made 
very plain." The Court flatly rejected this 
argument in Choctaw Nation, pointing out that 
"nothing in **1265 the Holt State Bank case or in 
the policy underlying its rule of construction ... 
requires that courts blind themselves to the 
circumstances of the grant in determining the intent 
of the grantor." [FN17] * 581397 U.S., at 634, 90 
S.Ct, at 1336. Since I believe that the Court has so 
blinded itself today, I respectfully dissent from its 
holding that the State of Montana has title to the 
bed of the Big Horn River. [FN 18] 
FN 17. The Court's reliance on Holt State 
Bank is misplaced for other reasons as 
well. At issue in that case was the bed of 
Mud Lake, a once navigable body of water 
in the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota. 
Prior to the case, most of the reservation, 
and all the tracts surrounding the lake, had 
been "relinquished and ceded" by the 
Indians and sold off to homesteaders. 270 
U.S., at 52-53, 46 S.Ct, at 198. No such 
circumstances are present here. See n. 18, 
infra. 
Moreover, a critical distinction between 
this case and Holt State Bank arises from 
the questionable status of the Red Lake 
Reservation before Minnesota became a 
State. The Court in Holt State Bank 
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concluded that in the treaties preceding 
statehood there had been, with respect to 
the Red Lake area-unlike other areas-"no 
formal setting apart of what was not ceded, 
nor any affirmative declaration of the 
rights of the Indians therein...." 270 U.S., 
at 58, 46 S.Ct., at 200 (footnote omitted). 
Thus, Holt State Bank clearly does not 
control a case, such as this one, in which, 
prior to statehood, the United States set 
apart by formal treaty a reservation that 
included navigable waters. See n. 10, 
supra. 
Finally, the Court fails to recognize that it 
is Holt State Bank, not Choctaw Nation, 
that stands as "a singular exception" to this 
Court's established line of cases involving 
claims to submerged lands adjacent to or 
encompassed by Indian reservations. See 
Choctaw Nation; Brewer-Elliott; Alaska 
Pacific Fisheries; Donnelly v. United 
Suites, all supra. 
FNl 8. I agree with the Court's resolution 
of the question of the power of the Tribe to 
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on 
reservation land owned in fee by 
nonmembers of the Tribe. I note only that 
nothing in the Court's disposition of that 
issue is inconsistent with the conclusion 
that the bed of the Big Horn River belongs 
to the Crow Indians. There is no 
suggestion that any parcels alienated in 
consequence of the Indian General 
Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, or the 
Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751, 
included portions of the bed of the Big 
Horn River. Further, the situation here is 
wholly unlike that in Puyallup Tribe v. 
Washington Game Dept, 433 U.S. 165, 97 
S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977). As 
the Court recognizes, ante, at 1256, the 
Puyallups alienated, in fee simple, the 
great majority of the lands in the 
reservation, including all the land abutting 
the Puyallup River. 433 U.S., at 173-174, 
and n. 11, 97 S.Ct, at 2621-2622, and n. 
11. This is not such a case. 
Justice STEVENS, concurring. 
In its opinion in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 
U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 25 L.Ed.2d 615, the Court 
repeatedly pointed out that ambiguities in the 
governing treaties should be resolved in favor of the 
Indian tribes. [FNl] That emphasis on a rule of 
construction favoring the tribes might arguably be 
read as having been intended to indicate that the 
strong presumption against dispositions *568 by the 
United States of land under navigable waters in the 
territories is not applicable to Indian reservations. 
However, for the following reasons, I do not so read 
the Choctaw Nation opinion. 
FNl. The Court described this rule of 
construction, and explained the reasoning 
underlying it: 
"[T]hese treaties are not to be considered 
as exercises in ordinary conveyancing. 
The Indian Nations did not seek out the 
United States and agree upon an exchange 
of lands in an arm's-length transaction. 
Rather, treaties were imposed upon them 
and they had no choice but to consent. As 
a consequence, this Court has often held 
that treaties with the Indians must be 
interpreted as they would have understood 
them, see, e. g.t Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 
1, 11, 20 S.Ct. 1, 5, 44 L.Ed. 49 (1899), 
and any doubtful expressions in them 
should be resolved in the Indians' favor. 
See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United 
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 41, 63 
L.Ed. 138 (1918). Indeed, the Treaty of 
Dancing Rabbit Creek itself provides that 
'in the construction of this Treaty wherever 
well founded doubt shall arise, it shall be 
construed most favourably towards the 
Choctaws.' 7 Stat. 336." 397 U.S., 
630-631, 90 S.Ct, at 1334. 
The Court went on to base its decision on 
this rule of construction: "[T]he court in [ 
United States v.] Holt State Bank [270 
U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465] itself 
examined the circumstances in detail and 
concluded 'the reservation was not 
intended to effect such a disposal.' 270 
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U.S., at 58 [46 S.Ct, at 200]. We think 
that the similar conclusion of the Court of 
Appeals in this case was in error, given the 
circumstances of the treaty grants and the 
countervailing rule of construction that 
well-founded doubt should be resolved in 
petitioners' favor." Id. at 634, 90 S.Ct., at 
1336. 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 
46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465, the **1266 Court 
unanimously and unequivocally had held that the 
presumption applied to Indian reservations. 
Although the references to Holt State Bank in the 
Court's opinion in Choctaw Nation can hardly be 
characterized as enthusiastic, see 397 U.S., at 634, 
90 S.Ct., at 1336, the Choctaw Nation opinion did 
not purport to abandon or to modify the rule of Holt 
State Bank. Indeed, Justice Douglas, while joining 
the opinion of the Court, wrote a separate opinion to 
explain why he had concluded that the Choctaw 
Nation record supplied the "exceptional 
circumstances" required under the Holt State Bank 
rule. [FN2] 
FN2. Before reviewing the history of the 
Cherokee and Choctaw Reservations, 
Justice Douglas wrote: 
"[W]hile the United States holds a domain 
as a territory, it may convey away the right 
to the bed of a navigable river, not 
retaining that property for transfer to a 
future State, though as stated in Holt State 
Bank that purpose is 'not lightly to be 
inferred, and should not be regarded as 
intended unless the intention was definitely 
declared or otherwise made very plain.' 
270 U.S., at 55 [46 S.Ct., at 199]. Such 
exceptional circumstances are present 
here." 397 U.S., at 639, 90 S.Ct, at 1338. 
Only seven Justices participated in the Choctaw 
Nation decision. [FN3] Justice WHITE, joined by 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice Black in dissent, 
relied heavily on the Holt State Bank line of 
authority, see 397 U.S., at 645- 648, 90 S.Ct, at 
1341-1343, and, as I noted above, Justice Douglas, 
in his concurrence, also appears to have accepted 
the Holt State Bank rule. Because only four 
Justices, including Justice Douglas, joined the 
Court's opinion, I do not believe it should be read as 
having made a substantial change in settled law. 
FN3. When Choctaw Nation was decided, 
the Court consisted of only eight active 
Justices. Justice Harlan did not 
participate in the consideration or decision 
of Choctaw Nation. 
*569 Finally, it is significant for me that Justice 
STEWART, who joined the Choctaw Nation 
opinion, is the author of the Court's opinion today. 
Just as he is, I am satisfied that the circumstances of 
the Choctaw Nation case differ significantly from 
the circumstances of this case. Whether I would 
have voted differently in the two cases if I had been 
a Member of the Court when Choctaw Nation was 
decided is a question I cannot answer. I am, 
however, convinced that unless the Court is to 
create a broad exception for Indian reservations, the 
Holt State Bank presumption is controlling. I 
therefore join the Court's opinion. 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Mark David OLIPHANT and Daniel B. Belgarde, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
The SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE et al. 
No. 76-5729. 
Argued Jan. 9,1978. 
Decided March 6, 1978. [FN*] 
FN* Together with Belgarde v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe et al, on certiorari before 
judgment to the same court (see this 
Court's Rule 23(5)). 
Criminal proceedings were brought in the 
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court against two 
non-Indian residents of the Port Madison 
Reservation. Both petitioners applied for a writ of 
habeas corpus to the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Washington, arguing that the 
tribal court does not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. In separate proceedings, the District 
Court denied the petitions. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, 544 F.2d 1007, affirmed in 
one case, and the other petitioner's appeal was 
pending before the Court of Appeals. Upon 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist, held that Indian tribal courts do not have 
inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish 
non-Indians, and hence may not assume such 
jurisdiction unless specifically authorized to do so 
by Congress. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Chief 
Justice Burger joined, filed a dissenting opinion. 
Order on remand, 573 F.2d 1137. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Indians €==>38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal 
jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians, and 
hence may not assume such jurisdiction unless 
specifically authorized to do so by Congress. 
[2] Indians €^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Neither the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 nor 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 addresses, let 
alone "confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians; the Indian Reorganization Act merely 
gives each Indian tribe the right to organize for its 
common welfare and to adopt an appropriate 
constitution and bylaws, and the Indian Civil Rights 
Act merely extends to a person within the tribe's 
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. Indian 
Reorganization Act, §§ 1 et seq., 16, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 
461 et seq., 476; Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 202, 
25 U.S.C.A. § 1302. 
[3] Indians €^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Although an early version of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act extended its guarantees only to American 
Indians, rather than to any person, and although the 
purpose of a later modification was to extend the 
Act's guarantees to "all persons who may be subject 
to jurisdiction of tribal governments whether 
Indians or non-Indians," this change was not 
intended to give Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians; instead, the modification merely 
demonstrated Congress* desire to extend the Act's 
guarantees to non-Indians if and where they come 
under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction by either 
treaty provision or act of Congress. Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, § 202, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302. 
> 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://printwestlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atD&format=HTMT F#Hat^H=A nn^snnnn non cnr\r\c 
98 S.Ct. 1011 
435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011) 
[4] Indians €^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
From the earliest treaties with Indian tribes, it was 
assumed that the tribes, few of which maintained 
any semblance of a formal court system, did not 
have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to 
punish non-Indians, absent a congressional statute 
or treaty provision to that effect. 
[5] Indians €=^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Congressional actions during the 19th century 
reflected that body's belief that Indian tribes do not 
have inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. 18U.S.C.A. §§ 1152, 1153. 
[6] Indians €=^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
The presumption, commonly shared by Congress, 
the executive branch, and the lower federal courts, 
that Indian tribal courts have no power to try 
non-Indians carries considerable weight. 
[7] Indians €=^3(3) 
209k3(3) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k3) 
[7] Indians €==>6.3(1) 
209k6.3(l) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k6(2), 209k6) 
In interpreting Indian treaties and statutes, doubtful 
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak 
and defenseless people who are the wards of the 
nation, dependent upon its protection and good 
faith; but treaty and statutory provisions which are 
not clear on their face may be clear from the 
surrounding circumstances and legislative history. 
[8] Indians €=^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of 
United States, Indian tribes necessarily yield the 
power to try non-Indians except in a manner 
acceptable to Congress. 
**1012 Syllabus [FN*] 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United 
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 
L.Ed.2d 499. 
*191 Indian tribal courts do not have inherent 
criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish 
non-Indians, and hence may not assume such 
jurisdiction unless specifically authorized to do so 
by Congress. Pp. 1014-1022. 
(a) From the earliest treaties with Indian tribes, it 
was assumed that the tribes, few of which 
maintained any semblance of a formal court system, 
did not have such jurisdiction absent a 
congressional statute or treaty provision to that 
effect, and at least one court held that such 
jurisdiction did not exist. Pp. 1015-1017. 
(b) Congress' actions during the 19th century 
reflected that body's belief that Indian tribes do not 
have inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Pp. 1017-1019. 
(c) The presumption, commonly shared by 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal 
courts, that tribal courts have no power to try 
non-Indians, carries considerable weight. Pp. 
1019-1020. 
(d) By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of 
the United States, Indian tribes necessarily yield the 
power to try non-Indians except in a manner 
acceptable to Congress, a fact which seems to be 
recognized by the Treaty of Point Elliott, signed by 
the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Pp. 1019-1022. 
544 F.2d 1007 (Oliphant judgment), and Belgarde 
judgment, reversed. 
Philip P. Malone, Poulsbo, Wash., for the 
petitioners. 
Slade Gorton, Arty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for the 
State of Washington, as amicus curiae, by special 
leave of Court. 
*192 Barry D. Ernstoff, Seattle, Wash., for 
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respondents. 
H. Bartow Fair, III, for the United States, as 
amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. 
**1013 Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
Two hundred years ago, the area bordering Puget 
Sound consisted of a large number of politically 
autonomous Indian villages, each occupied by from 
a few dozen to over 100 Indians. These loosely 
related villages were aggregated into a series of 
Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has 
become the focal point of this litigation. By the 
1855 Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927, the 
Suquamish Indian Tribe *193 relinquished all rights 
that it might have had in the lands of the State of 
Washington and agreed to settle on a 7,276-acre 
reservation near Port Madison, Wash. Located on 
Puget Sound across from the city of Seattle, the Port 
Madison Reservation is a checkerboard of tribal 
community land, allotted Indian lands, property 
held in fee simple by non-Indians, and various roads 
and public highways maintained by Kitsap County. 
[FN1] 
FN1. According to the District Court's 
findings of fact "[The] Madison Indian 
Reservation consists of approximately 
7276 acres of which approximately 63% 
thereof is owned in fee simple absolute by 
non-Indians and the remainder 37% is 
Indian-owned lands subject to the trust 
status of the United States, consisting 
mostly of unimproved acreage upon which 
no persons reside. Residing on the 
reservation is an estimated population of 
approximately 2928 non-Indians living in 
976 dwelling units. There lives on the 
reservation approximately 50 members of 
the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Within the 
reservation are numerous public highways 
of the State of Washington, public schools, 
public utilities and other facilities in which 
neither the Suquamish Indian Tribe nor the 
United States has any ownership or 
interest." App. 75. The Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, unlike many other Indian tribes, did 
not consent to non-Indian homesteading of 
unallotted or "surplus" lands within their 
reservation pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 348 
and 43 U.S.C. §§ 1 195-1197. Instead, the 
substantial non-Indian population on the 
Port Madison Reservation is primarily the 
result of the sale of Indian allotments to 
non-Indians by the Secretary of the 
Interior. Congressional legislation has 
allowed such sales where the allotments 
were in heirship, fell to "incompetents," or 
were surrendered in lieu of other 
selections. The substantial non-Indian 
landholdings on the Reservation are also a 
result of the lifting of various trust 
restrictions, a factor which has enabled 
individual Indians to sell their allotments. 
See 25 U.S.C. §§349,392. 
The Suquamish Indians are governed by a tribal 
government which in 1973 adopted a Law and 
Order Code. The Code, which covers a variety of 
offenses from theft to rape, purports to extend the 
Tribe's criminal jurisdiction over both Indians and 
non-Indians. [FN2] Proceedings are held in the 
Suquamish *194 Indian Provisional Court. 
Pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 
Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, defendants are entitled 
to many of the due process protections accorded to 
defendants in federal or state criminal proceedings. 
[FN3] However, the guarantees are not identical. 
Non-Indians, for example, are excluded from 
Suquamish tribal court juries. [FN4] 
FN2. Notices were placed in prominent 
places at the entrances to the Port Madison 
Reservation informing the public that entry 
onto the Reservation would be deemed 
implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction 
of the Suquamish tribal court. 
FN3. In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 16 
S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896), this Court 
held that the Bill of Rights in the Federal 
Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal 
governments. 
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FN4. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
provides for "a trial by jury of not less than 
six persons," 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10), but the 
tribal court is not explicitly prohibited 
from excluding non-Indians from the jury 
even where a non-Indian is being tried. In 
1977, the Suquamish Tribe amended its 
Law and Order Code to provide that only 
Suquamish tribal members shall serve as 
jurors in tribal court. 
Both petitioners are non-Indian residents of the 
Port Madison Reservation. Petitioner Mark David 
Oliphant was arrested by tribal authorities during 
the Suquamish's annual Chief Seattle Days 
celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal 
officer and resisting arrest. After arraignment 
before the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his 
own recognizance. Petitioner Daniel B. Belgarde 
was arrested by tribal authorities after an alleged 
high-speed race along the Reservation highways 
that only ended when Belgarde collided with a 
tribal police vehicle. Belgarde posted bail and was 
released. Six days later he was arraigned and 
**1014 charged under the tribal Code with 
"recklessly endangering another person" and 
injuring tribal property. Tribal court proceedings 
against both petitioners have been stayed pending a 
decision in this case. 
[1] Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus to the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington. Petitioners 
argued that the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court 
does not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. In separate proceedings, the District 
Court disagreed *195 with petitioners' argument 
and denied the petitions. On August 24, 1976, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
denial of habeas corpus in the case of petitioner 
Oliphant. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007. 
Petitioner Belgarde's appeal is still pending before 
the Court of Appeals. [FN5] We granted certiorari, 
431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059, to 
decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that they 
do not. 
FN5. Belgarde's petition for certiorari was 
granted while his appeal was still pending 
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. No further proceedings in that 
court have been held pending our decision. 
I 
[2][3] Respondents do not contend that their 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
stems from affirmative congressional authorization 
or treaty provision. [FN6] Instead, respondents 
*196 urge that such jurisdiction flows automatically 
from the "Tribe's retained inherent powers of 
government over the Port Madison Indian 
Reservation." Seizing on language in our opinions 
describing Indian tribes as "quasi-sovereign 
entities," see, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535, 554, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2484, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 
(1974), the Court of Appeals agreed and held that 
Indian tribes, "though conquered and dependent, 
retain those powers of autonomous states that are 
neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly 
terminated by Congress." According to the Court 
of Appeals, criminal jurisdiction over anyone 
committing an offense on the reservation is a "sine 
qua non" of such powers. 
FN6. Respondents do contend that 
Congress has "confirmed" the power of 
Indian tribes to try and to punish 
non-Indians through the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 987, 
25 U.S.C. § 476, and the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
Neither Act, however, addresses, let alone 
"confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. The Indian 
Reorganization Act merely gives each 
Indian Tribe the right "to organize for its 
common welfare" and to "adopt an 
appropriate constitution and bylaws." 
With certain specific additions not relevant 
here, the tribal council is to have such 
powers as are vested "by existing law." 
The Indian Civil Rights Act merely 
extends to "any person" within the tribe's 
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights of the Federal 
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Constitution. 
As respondents note, an early version of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act extended its 
guarantees only to "American Indians," 
rather than to "any person." The purpose 
of the later modification was to extend the 
Act's guarantees to "all persons who may 
be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal 
governments, whether Indians or 
non-Indians." Summary Report on the 
Constitutional Rights of American Indians, 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). But this 
change was certainly not intended to give 
Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Nor can it be read to 
"confirm" respondents' argument that 
Indian tribes have inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Instead, the 
modification merely demonstrates 
Congress' desire to extend the Act's 
guarantees to non-Indians if and where 
they come under a tribe's criminal or civil 
jurisdiction by either treaty provision or 
Act of Congress. 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe does not stand alone 
today in its assumption of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Of the 127 reservation court systems 
that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the 
United States, 33 purport to extend that jurisdiction 
to non-Indians. [FN7] Twelve other Indian **1015 
tribes have enacted ordinances which would permit 
the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Like the Suquamish these tribes claim 
authority to try non-Indians not on the basis of 
congressional statute or treaty provision but by 
reason of their retained national sovereignty. 
FN7. Of the 127 courts currently operating 
on Indian reservations, 71 (including the 
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court) are 
tribal courts, established and functioning 
pursuant to tribal legislative powers; 30 
are "CFR Courts" operating under the 
Code of Federal Regulations, 25 CFR § 
11.1 et seq. (1977); 16 are traditional 
courts of the New Mexico pueblos; and 10 
are conservation courts. The CFR Courts 
are the offspring of the Courts of Indian 
Offenses, first provided for in the Indian 
Department Appropriations Act of 1888, 
25 Stat. 217, 233. See W. Hagan, Indian 
Police and Judges (1966). By regulations 
issued in 1935, the jurisdiction of CFR 
Courts is restricted to offenses committed 
by Indians within the reservation. 25 CFR 
§ 11.2(a)(1977). The case before us is 
concerned only with the criminal 
jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
The effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise 
criminal *197 jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
however, is a relatively new phenomenon. And 
where the effort has been made in the past, it has 
been held that the jurisdiction did not exist. Until 
the middle of this century, few Indian tribes 
maintained any semblance of a formal court system. 
Offenses by one Indian against another were 
usually handled by social and religious pressure and 
not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on 
restitution rather than on punishment. In 1834 the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the then 
status of Indian criminal systems: "With the 
exception of two or three tribes, who have within a 
few years past attempted to establish some few laws 
and regulations among themselves, the Indian tribes 
are without laws, and the chiefs without much 
authority to exercise any restraint." H.R.Rep. No. 
474, 23d Cong, 1st Sess, 91 (1834). 
[4] It is therefore not surprising to find no specific 
discussion of the problem before us in the volumes 
of the United States Reports. But the problem did 
not lie entirely dormant for two centuries. A few 
tribes during the 19th century did have formal 
criminal systems. From the earliest treaties with 
these tribes, it was apparently assumed that the 
tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty 
provision to that effect. For example, the 1830 
Treaty with the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which had 
one of the most sophisticated of tribal structures, 
guaranteed to the Tribe "the jurisdiction and 
government of all the persons and property that may 
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be within their limits." Despite the broad terms of 
this governmental guarantee, however, the 
Choctaws at the conclusion of this treaty provision 
"express a wish that Congress may grant to the 
Choctaws the right of punishing by their own laws 
any white man who shall come into their nation, and 
infringe any of their national regulations." [FN8] 
**1016 Art. 4, 7 Stat. 333 (emphasis added). Such 
a *198 request for affirmative congressional 
authority is inconsistent with respondents' belief 
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is 
inherent in tribal sovereignty. Faced by attempts 
*199 of the Choctaw Tribe to try non-Indian 
offenders in the early 1800's the United States 
Attorneys General also concluded that the Choctaws 
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
absent congressional authority. See 2 
Op.Atty.Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op.Atty.Gen. 174 
(1855). According to the Attorney General in 1834, 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, is inter 
alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing 
the sovereignty of the United States over the 
territory assigned to the Indian nation and the 
dependence of the Indians on the United States. 
FN8. The history of Indian treaties in the 
United States is consistent with the 
principle that Indian tribes may not assume 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
without the permission of Congress. The 
earliest treaties typically expressly 
provided that "any citizen of the United 
States, who shall do an injury to any Indian 
of the [tribal] nation, or to any other Indian 
or Indians residing in their towns, and 
under their protection, shall be punished 
according to the laws of the United States." 
See, e. g, Treaty with the Shawnees, Art. 
Ill, 7 Stat. 26 (1786). While, as 
elaborated further below, these provisions 
were not necessary to remove criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians from the 
Indian tribes, they would naturally have 
served an important function in the 
developing stage of United States-Indian 
relations by clarifying jurisdictional limits 
of the Indian tribes. The same treaties 
generally provided that "[i]f any citizen of 
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the United States . . . shall attempt to 
settle on any of the lands hereby allotted to 
the Indians to live and hunt on, such 
person shall forfeit the protection of the 
United States of America, and the Indians 
may punish him or not as they please." 
See, e. g, Treaty with the Choctaws, Art. 
IV, 7 Stat. 22 (1786). Far from 
representing a recognition of any inherent 
Indian criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians settling on tribal lands, these 
provisions were instead intended as a 
means of discouraging non-Indian 
settlements on Indian territory, in 
contravention of treaty provisions to the 
contrary. See 5 Annals of Cong. 903-904 
(1796). Later treaties dropped this 
provision and provided instead that 
non-Indian settlers would be removed by 
the United States upon complaint being 
lodged by the tribe. See, e. g, Treaty with 
the Sacs and Foxes, 7 Stat. 84 (1804). 
As the relationship between Indian tribes 
and the United States developed through 
the passage of time, specific provisions for 
the punishment of non-Indians by the 
United States, rather than by the tribes, 
slowly disappeared from the treaties. 
Thus, for example, none of the treaties 
signed by Washington Indians in the 
1850's explicitly proscribed criminal 
prosecution and punishment of non-Indians 
by the Indian tribes. As discussed below, 
however, several of the treaty provisions 
can be read as recognizing that criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in 
the United States rather than in the tribes. 
The disappearance of provisions explicitly 
providing for the punishment of 
non-Indians by the United States, rather 
than by the Indian tribes, coincides with 
and is at least partly explained by the 
extension of federal enclave law over 
non-Indians in the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts and the general recognition by 
Attorneys General and lower federal courts 
that Indians did not have jurisdiction to try 
non-Indians. See infra, at 1016-1017. 
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When it was felt necessary to expressly 
spell out respective jurisdictions, later 
treaties still provided that criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in 
the United States. See, e. g, Treaty with 
the Utah-Tabeguache Band, Art. 6, 13 
Stat. 674(1863). 
Only one treaty signed by the United 
States has ever provided for any form of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians (other than in the 
illegal-settler context noted above). The 
first treaty signed by the United States with 
an Indian tribe, the 1778 Treaty with the 
Delawares, provided that neither party to 
the treaty could "proceed to the infliction 
of punishments on the citizens of the other, 
otherwise than by securing the offender or 
offenders by imprisonment, or any other 
competent means, till a fair and impartial 
trial can be had by judges or juries of both 
parties, as near as can be to the laws, 
customs and usages of the contracting 
parties and natural justice: The mode of 
such tryals to be hereafter fixed by the 
wise men of the United States in Congress 
assembled, with the assistance of . . . 
deputies of the Delaware nation . . . ." 
Treaty with the Delawares, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 
14 (emphasis added). While providing for 
Delaware participation in the trial of 
non-Indians, this treaty section established 
that non-Indians could only be tried under 
the auspices of the United States and in a 
manner fixed by the Continental Congress. 
At least one court has previously considered the 
power of Indian courts to try non-Indians and it also 
held against jurisdiction. [FN9] In Ex parte Kenyon 
, 14 Fed.Cas. page 353, No. 7,720 *200 
W.D.Ark.1878), Judge Isaac C. Parker, who as 
District Court Judge for the Western District of 
Arkansas was constantly exposed to the legal 
relationships between Indians and non-Indians, 
[FN10] held that to give an Indian tribal **1017 
court "jurisdiction of the person of an offender, 
such offender must be an Indian." Id, at 355. The 
conclusion of Judge Parker was reaffirmed *201 
only recently in a 1970 opinion of the Solicitor of 
the Department of the Interior. See Criminal 
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes over Non-Indians, 11 
LD. 113. [FN11] 
FN9. According to Felix Cohen's 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 148 
(U.S. Dept. of the Interior 1941) "attempts 
of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over 
non-Indians . . . have been generally 
condemned by the federal courts since the 
end of the treaty-making period, and the 
writ of habeas corpus has been used to 
discharge white defendants from tribal 
custody." 
FN 10. Judge Parker sat as the judge of the 
United States District Court for the 
Western District of Arkansas from 1875 
until 1896. By reason of the laws of 
Congress in effect at the time, that 
particular court not only handled the 
normal docket of federal cases arising in 
the Western District of Arkansas, but also 
had criminal jurisdiction over what was 
then called the "Indian Territory." This 
area varied in size during Parker's tenure; 
at one time it extended as far west as the 
eastern border of Colorado, and always 
included substantial parts of what would 
later become the State of Oklahoma. In 
the exercise of this jurisdiction over the 
Indian Territory, the Court in which he sat 
was necessarily in constant contact with 
individual Indians, the tribes of which they 
were members, and the white men who 
dealt with them and often preyed upon 
them. 
Judge Parker's views of the law were not 
always upheld by this Court. See 2 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 276, pp. 115-116, n. 
3 (3d ed. 1940). A reading of Wigmore, 
however, indicates that he was as critical 
of the decisions of this Court there 
mentioned as this Court was of the 
evidentiary rulings of Judge Parker. 
Nothing in these long forgotten disputes 
detracts from the universal esteem in 
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which the Indian tribes which were subject 
to the jurisdiction of his court held Judge 
Parker. One of his biographers, describing 
the judge's funeral, states that after the 
grave was filled "[t]he principal chief of 
the Choctaws, Pleasant Porter, came 
forward and placed a wreath of wild 
flowers on the grave." H. Croy, He Hanged 
Them High 222 (1952). 
It may be that Judge Parker's views as to 
the ultimate destiny of the Indian people 
are not in accord with current thinking on 
the subject, but we have observed in more 
than one of our cases that the views of the 
people on this issue as reflected in the 
judgments of Congress itself have changed 
from one era to the next. See Kake 
Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 71- 74, 82 
S.Ct. 562, 568-570, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962). 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that 
Judge Parker was, by his own lights and by 
the lights of the time in which he lived, a 
judge who was thoroughly acquainted with 
and sympathetic to the Indians and Indian 
tribes which were subject to the 
jurisdiction of his court, as well as familiar 
with the law which governed them. See 
generally Hell on the Border (1971, J. 
Gregory & R. Strickland, eds.). 
FN11. The 1970 opinion of the Solicitor 
was withdrawn in 1974 but has not been 
replaced. No reason was given for the 
withdrawal. 
While Congress was concerned almost from its 
beginning with the special problems of law 
enforcement on the Indian reservations, it did not 
initially address itself to the problem of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the reasons 
previously stated, there was little reason to be 
concerned with assertions of tribal court jurisdiction 
over non-Indians because of the absence of formal 
tribal judicial systems. Instead, Congress' concern 
was with providing effective protection for the 
Indians "from the violences of the lawless part of 
our frontier inhabitants." Seventh Annual Address 
of President George Washington, 1 Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789- 1897, pp. 181, 185 
(J. Richardson, ed., 1897). Without such 
protection, it was felt that "all the exertions of the 
Government to prevent destructive retaliations by 
the Indians will prove fruitless and all our present 
agreeable prospects illusory." Ibid Beginning with 
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 
therefore, Congress assumed federal jurisdiction 
over offenses by non-Indians against Indians which 
"would be punishable by the laws of [the] state or 
district . . . if the offense had been committed 
against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof." In 
1817, Congress went one step further and extended 
federal enclave law to the Indian country; the only 
exception was for "any offence committed by one 
Indian against another." 3 Stat. 383, now codified, 
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
It was in 1834 that Congress was first directly 
faced with the prospect of Indians trying 
non-Indians. In the Western Territory bill, [FN 12] 
Congress proposed to create an Indian territory 
beyond the western-directed destination of the 
settlers; *202 the territory was to be governed by a 
confederation of Indian tribes and was expected 
ultimately to become a State of the Union. While 
the bill would have created a political territory with 
broad governing powers, Congress was careful not 
to give the tribes of the territory criminal 
jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens 
traveling through the area. [FN 13] The reasons 
were quite practical: 
FN12. See H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 
lstSess.,36(1834). 
FN13. The Western Territory bill, like the 
early Indian treaties, see n. 6, supra, did 
not extend the protection of the United 
States to non-Indians who settled without 
Government business in Indian territory. 
See Western Territory bill, § 6, in 
H.R.Rep. No. 474, supra, at 35; id, at 18. 
This exception, like that in the early 
treaties, was presumably meant to 
discourage settlement on land that was 
reserved exclusively for the use of the 
various Indian tribes. Today, many 
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reservations, including the Port Madison 
Reservation, have extensive non-Indian 
populations. The percentage of 
non-Indian residents grew as a direct and 
intended result of congressional policies in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
promoting the assimilation of the Indians 
into the non-Indian culture. Respondents 
point to no statute, in comparison to the 
Western Territory bill, where Congress has 
intended to give Indian tribes jurisdiction 
today over non-Indians residing within 
reservations. Even as drafted, many 
Congressmen felt that the bill was too 
radical a shift in United States-Indian 
relations and the bill was tabled. See 10 
Cong.Deb. 4779 (1834). While the 
Western Territory bill was resubmitted 
several times in revised form, it was never 
passed. See generally R. Gittinger, The 
Formation of the State of Oklahoma 
(1939). 
**1018 "Officers, and persons in the service of 
the United States, and persons required to 
reside in the Indian country by treaty 
stipulations, must necessarily be placed under 
the protection, and subject to the laws of the 
United States. To persons merely travelling in 
the Indian country the same protection is 
extended. The want of fixed laws, of 
competent tribunals of justice, which must for 
some time continue in the Indian country, 
absolutely requires for the peace of both sides 
that this protection should be extended." 
H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 18 
(1834). 
*203 Congress' concern over criminal jurisdiction 
in this proposed Indian Territory contrasts markedly 
with its total failure to address criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians on other reservations, which 
frequently bordered non-Indian settlements. The 
contrast suggests that Congress shared the view of 
the Executive Branch and lower federal courts that 
Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try 
non-Indians. 
[5] This unspoken assumption was also evident in 
other congressional actions during the 19th century. 
In 1854, for example, Congress amended the 
Trade and Intercourse Act to proscribe the 
prosecution in federal court of an Indian who has 
already been tried in tribal court. § 3, 10 Stat. 270, 
now codified, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. No 
similar provision, such as would have been required 
by parallel logic if tribal courts had jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, was enacted barring retrial of 
non-Indians. Similarly, in the Major Crimes Act of 
1885, Congress placed under the jurisdiction of 
federal courts Indian offenders who commit certain 
specified major offenses. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 
23 Stat. 385, now codified, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 
1153. If tribal courts may try non-Indians, 
however, as respondents contend, those tribal courts 
are free to try non-Indians even for such major 
offenses as Congress may well have given the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members 
of their own tribe committing the exact same 
offenses. [FN 14] 
FN 14. The Major Crimes Act provides that 
Indians committing any of the enumerated 
offenses "shall be subject to the same laws 
and penalties as all other persons 
committing any of the above offenses, 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States." (Emphasis added.) While 
the question has never been directly 
addressed by this Court, Courts of Appeals 
have read this language to exclude tribal 
jurisdiction over the Indian offender. See, 
e. g„ Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 
214 (CA10 1967); Felicia v. United States 
, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (CA8 1974). We have 
no reason to decide today whether 
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act is 
exclusive. 
The legislative history of the original 
version of the Major Crimes Act, which 
was introduced as a House amendment to 
the Indian Appropriation Act of 1855, 
creates some confusion on the question of 
exclusive jurisdiction. As originally 
worded, the amendment would have 
provided for trial in the United States 
courts "and not otherwise" Apparently at 
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the suggestion of Congressman Budd, who 
believed that concurrent jurisdiction in the 
courts of the United States was sufficient, 
the words "and not otherwise" were 
deleted when the amendment was later 
reintroduced. See 16 Cong.Rec. 934-935 
(1885). However, as finally accepted by 
the Senate and passed by both Houses, the 
amendment did provide that the Indian 
offender would be punished as any other 
offender, "within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States." The issue of 
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes 
was mooted for all practical purposes by 
the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968 which limits the punishment that 
can be imposed by Indian tribal courts to a 
term of 6 months or a fine of $500. 
*204 In 1891, this Court recognized that Congress1 
various actions and inactions in regulating criminal 
jurisdiction on Indian reservations demonstrated an 
intent to reserve jurisdiction over non-Indians for 
the federal courts. In In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 
115-116, 11 S.Ct. 939, 941, 35 L.Ed. 635 (1891), 
the Court noted that the policy of Congress had 
been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian country 
"such power of self-government as was thought to 
be consistent with the safety of the white population 
with which they may have come in contact, and to 
encourage them as far as possible in **1019 raising 
themselves to our standard of civilization." The 
"general object" of the congressional statutes was to 
allow Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all 
controversies between Indians, or where a member 
of the nation is the only party to the proceeding, and 
to reserve to the courts of the United States 
jurisdiction of all actions to which its own citizens 
are parties on either side." Ibid While Congress 
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose 
criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make 
express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century 
ago that Congress consistently believed this to be 
the necessary result of its repeated legislative 
actions. 
In a 1960 Senate Report, that body expressly 
confirmed its *205 assumption that Indian tribal 
courts are without inherent jurisdiction to try 
non-Indians, and must depend on the Federal 
Government for protection from intruders. [FN 15] 
In considering a statute that would prohibit 
unauthorized entry upon Indian land for the purpose 
of hunting or fishing, the Senate Report noted: 
FN15. In 1977, a congressional Policy 
Review Commission, citing the lower court 
decisions in Oliphant and Belgarde, 
concluded that "[tjhere is an established 
legal basis for tribes to exercise 
jurisdiction over non-Indians." 1 Final 
Report of the American Indian Policy 
Review Commission 114, 117, 152-154 
(1977). However, the Commission's 
report does not deny that for almost 200 
years before the lower courts decided 
Oliphant and Belgarde, the three branches 
of the Federal Government were in 
apparent agreement that Indian tribes do 
not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. As 
the Vice Chairman of the Commission, 
Congressman Lloyd Meeds, noted in 
dissent, "such jurisdiction has generally 
not been asserted and . . . the lack of 
legislation on this point reflects a 
congressional assumption that there was no 
such tribal jurisdiction." Final Report, 
supra, at 587. 
"The problem confronting Indian tribes with 
sizable reservations is that the United States 
provides no protection against trespassers 
comparable to the protection it gives to Federal 
property as exemplified by title 18, United 
States Code, section 1863 [trespass on national 
forest lands]. Indian property owners should 
have the same protection as other property 
owners. For example, a private hunting club 
may keep nonmembers off its game lands or it 
may issue a permit for a fee. One who comes 
on such lands without permission may be 
prosecuted under State law but a non-Indian 
trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys 
immunity. This is by reason of the fact that 
Indian tribal law is enforcible against Indians 
only; not against non-Indians. 
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"Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction 
of Indian courts and cannot be tried in Indian 
courts on trespass *206 charges. Further, 
there are no Federal laws which can be invoked 
against trespassers. 
"The committee has considered this bill and 
believes that the legislation is meritorious. 
The legislation will give to the Indian tribes 
and to individual Indian owners certain rights 
that now exist as to others, and fills a gap in the 
present law for the protection of their 
property." S.Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 2-3 (1960) (emphasis added). 
II 
[6] While not conclusive on the issue before us, 
the commonly shared presumption of Congress, the 
Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that 
tribal courts do not have the power to try 
non-Indians carries considerable weight. Cf. 
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 245-247, 17 
S.Ct 107, 108-109, 41 L.Ed. 419 (1896); Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 391-393, 24 S.Ct. 712, 
715, 48 L.Ed. 1030 (1904); Warren Trading Post 
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690, 85 
S.Ct. 1242, 1245, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965); 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 
444-445, 95 s.Ct. 1082, 1092-1093, 43 L.Ed.2d 
300 (1965). "Indian law" draws principally upon 
the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive 
Branch and legislation passed by Congress. These 
instruments, which beyond their actual text form the 
backdrop **1020 for the intricate web of judicially 
made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation 
but must be read in light of the common notions of 
the day and the assumptions of those who drafted 
them. Ibid. 
[7] While in isolation the Treaty of Point Elliott, 
12 Stat. 927 (1855), would appear to be silent as to 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the 
addition of historical perspective casts substantial 
doubt upon the existence of such jurisdiction. 
[FN 16] In the Ninth Article, for example, the 
Suquamish *207 "acknowledge their dependence on 
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the government of the United States." As Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall explained in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 551-552, 554, 8 L.Ed. 483 
(1832), such an acknowledgment is not a mere 
abstract recognition of the United States' 
sovereignty. "The Indian nations were, from their 
situation, necessarily dependent on [the United 
States] . . . for their protection from lawless and 
injurious intrusions into their country." Id, at 555. 
By acknowledging their dependence on the United 
States, in the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Suquamish 
were in all probability recognizing that the United 
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders 
who came within their Reservation. Other 
provisions *208 of the Treaty also point to the 
absence of tribal jurisdiction. Thus the Tribe 
"agree [s] not to shelter or conceal offenders against 
the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up 
to the authorities for trial." Read in conjunction 
with 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which extends federal 
enclave law to non-Indian offenses on Indian 
reservations, this provision implies that the 
Suquamish are to promptly deliver up any 
non-Indian offender, rather than try and punish him 
themselves. [FN17] 
FN 16. When treaties with the Washington 
Tribes were first contemplated, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent 
instructions to the Commission to Hold 
Treaties with the Indian Tribes in 
Washington Territory and in the Blackfoot 
Country. Included with the instructions 
were copies of treaties previously 
negotiated with the Omaha Indians, 10 
Stat. 1043 (1854), and with the Ottoe and 
Missouria Indians, 10 Stat. 1038 (1854), 
which the Commissioner "regarded as 
exhibiting provisions proper on the part of 
the Government and advantages to the 
Indians" and which he felt would "afford 
valuable suggestions." The criminal 
provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott are 
clearly patterned after the criminal 
provisions in these "exemplary" treaties, in 
most respects copying the provisions 
verbatim. Like the Treaty of Point Elliott, 
the treaties with the Omahas and with the 
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Ottoes and Missourias did not specifically 
address the issue of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Sometime after the receipt of these 
instructions, the Washington treaty 
Commission itself prepared and discussed 
a draft treaty which specifically provided 
that M[i]njuries committed by whites 
towards them [are] not to be revenged, but 
on complaint being made they shall be 
tried by the Laws of the United States and 
if convicted the offenders punished." For 
some unexplained reason, however, in 
negotiating a treaty with the Indians, the 
Commission went back to the language 
used in the two "exemplary" treaties sent 
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
Although respondents contend that the 
Commission returned to the original 
language because of tribal opposition to 
relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, there is no evidence to 
support this view of the matter. Instead, it 
seems probable that the Commission 
preferred to use the language that had been 
recommended by the Office of Indian 
Affairs. As discussed below, the language 
ultimately used, wherein the Tribe 
acknowledged its dependence on the 
United States and promised to be "friendly 
with all citizens thereof," could well have 
been understood as acknowledging 
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. 
FN 17. In interpreting Indian treaties and 
statutes, " '[djoubtfiil expressions are to be 
resolved in favor of the weak and 
defenseless people who are the wards of 
the nation, dependent upon its protection 
and good faith.1 " McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174, 93 
S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973), 
see Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737, 760, 18 
L.Ed. 667 (1866); United States v. Nice, 
241 U.S. 591, 599, 36 S.Ct. 696, 698, 60 
L.Ed. 1192 (1916). But treaty and 
statutory provisions which are not clear on 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
Page 12 
their face may "be clear from the 
surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history." Cf. DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 
1092, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975). 
By themselves, these treaty provisions would 
probably not be sufficient to remove criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians if the Tribe otherwise 
retained such jurisdiction. But an examination of 
our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even 
ignoring treaty **1021 provisions and 
congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative 
delegation of such power by Congress. Indian 
tribes do retain elements of "quasi-sovereign" 
authority after ceding their lands to the United 
States and announcing their dependence on the 
Federal Government. See Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 15, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831). But the 
tribes' retained powers are not such that they are 
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or 
congressional enactments. As the Court of Appeals 
recognized Indian tribes are prohibited from 
exercising both those powers of autonomous states 
that are expressly terminated by Congress and those 
powers "inconsistent with their status." Oliphant v. 
Schlie, 544 F.2d, at 1009 (emphasis added). 
Indian reservations are "a part of the territory of 
the United *209 States." United States v. Rogers, 4 
How. 567, 571, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846). Indian 
tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the 
assent of the United States, and under their 
authority." Id, at 572. Upon incorporation into 
the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes 
thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the 
United States and their exercise of separate power is 
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of 
this overriding sovereignty. "[T]heir rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] 
necessarily diminished." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 
Wheat. 543, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823). 
We have already described some of the inherent 
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their 
incorporation into the United States. In Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 
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"power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased," was inherently lost to 
the overriding sovereignty of the United States. 
And in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, the 
Chief Justice observed that since Indian tribes are 
"completely under the sovereignty and dominion of 
the United States, . . . any attempt [by foreign 
nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political 
connexion with them, would be considered by all as 
an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility." 
5 Pet, at 17-18. 
[8] Nor are the intrinsic limitations on Indian tribal 
authority restricted to limitations on the tribes' 
power to transfer lands or exercise external political 
sovereignty. In the first case to reach this Court 
dealing with the status of Indian tribes, Mr. Justice 
Johnson in a separate concurrence summarized the 
nature of the limitations inherently flowing from the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States as 
follows: "[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in 
the Indians, amount . . . to an exclusion of all 
competitors [to the United States] from their 
markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty 
amounts to the right of governing every person 
within their limits except themselves." Fletcher v. 
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) 
(emphasis added). Protection of territory within its 
*210 external political boundaries is, of course, as 
central to the sovereign interests of the United 
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But 
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested 
an equally great solicitude that its citizens be 
protected by the United States from unwarranted 
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of 
the United States to try and criminally punish is an 
important manifestation of the power to restrict 
personal liberty. By submitting to the overriding 
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes 
therefore necessarily give up their power to try 
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a 
manner acceptable to Congress. This principle 
would have been obvious a century ago when most 
Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed 
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice." 
H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong, 1st Sess, 18 (1834). 
It should be no less obvious today, even though 
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present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic 
advances over their historical antecedents. 
**1022 In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 
S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), the Court was 
faced with almost the inverse of the issue before us 
here—whether, prior to the passage of the Major 
Crimes Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to try 
Indians who had offended against fellow Indians on 
reservation land. In concluding that criminal 
jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe, it found 
particular guidance in the "nature and circumstances 
of the case." The United States was seeking to 
extend United States 
"law, by argument and inference only, . . . over 
aliens and strangers; over the members of a 
community separated by race [and] tradition, . . . 
from the authority and power which seeks to 
impose upon them the restraints of an external 
and unknown code . . .; which judges them by a 
standard made by others and not for them . . . . It 
tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs 
of *211 their people, nor the law of their land, but 
by . . . a different race, according to the law of a 
social state of which they have an imperfect 
conception " Id, at 571, 3 S.Ct, at 406. 
These considerations, applied here to the 
non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak 
equally strongly against the validity of respondents' 
contention that Indian tribes, although fully 
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United 
States, retain the power to try non-Indians 
according to their own customs and procedure. 
As previously noted, Congress extended the 
jurisdiction of federal courts, in the Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790, to offenses committed by 
non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country. 
In doing so, Congress was careful to extend to the 
non-Indian offender the basic criminal rights that 
would attach in non-Indian related cases. Under 
respondents' theory, however, Indian tribes would 
have been free to try the same non-Indians without 
these careful proceedings unless Congress 
affirmatively legislated to the contrary. Such an 
exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens of 
the United States would belie the tribes' forfeiture 
of full sovereignty in return for the protection of the 
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United States. 
In summary, respondents' position ignores that 
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the 
United States. The soil and people within these 
limits are under the political control of the 
Government of the United States, or of the States 
of the Union. There exists in the broad domain 
of sovereignty but these two. There may be 
cities, counties, and other organized bodies with 
limited legislative functions, but they . . . exist in 
subordination to one or the other of these." 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379, 6 
S.Ct. 1109, 1111, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886). 
We recognize that some Indian tribal court 
systems have become increasingly sophisticated and 
resemble in many *212 respects their state 
counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the 
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
which extends certain basic procedural rights to 
anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the 
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise 
by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians only a few decades ago have 
disappeared. Finally, we are not unaware of the 
prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's 
reservations which the tribes forcefully argue 
requires the ability to try non-Indians. [FN 18] But 
these are considerations for Congress to weigh in 
deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be 
authorized to try non-Indians. They have little 
relevance to the principles which lead us to 
conclude that Indian tribes do not have inherent 
**1023 jurisdiction to try and to punish 
non-Indians. The judgments below are therefore 
FN18. See 4 National American Indian 
Court Judges Assn., Justice and the 
American Indian 51-52 (1974); Hearings 
on S. 1 and S. 1400 (reform of the Federal 
Criminal Laws) before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 6469 etseq. (1973). 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice BRENNAN took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. 
I agree with the court below that the "power to 
preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua 
non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally 
possessed." Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 
1009 (CA9 1976). In the absence of affirmative 
withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that 
Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their 
retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all 
persons who commit offenses against tribal law 
within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent. 
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Supreme Court of the United States 
Paul SEYMOUR, Petitioner, 
v. 
SUPERINTENDENT OF WASHINGTON STATE 
PENITENTIARY. 
No. 62. 
Argued Dec. 13, 1961. 
Decided Jan. 15, 1962. 
Habeas corpus proceeding by an enrolled, 
unemancipated member of the Colville Indian Tribe 
who had been convicted in a state court of offense 
of attempted burglary. The Supreme Court of 
Washington, 55 Wash.2d 109, 346 P.2d 669, denied 
the petition, and Indian was granted certiorari. The 
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black, held that Act of 
1906 providing for sale of mineral lands and for 
settlement and entry under homestead laws of other 
surplus land remaining on diminished Colville 
Indian Reservation, did not dissolve such 
reservation, but the reservation remains in 
existence, and state therefore did not have 
jurisdiction over the offense which was committed 
on such reservation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Federal Courts € ^ 5 0 6 
170Bk506 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 106k397) 
Certiorari would be granted from a state's denial of 
habeas corpus to an Indian prisoner, where question 
of whether place where crime occurred was Indian 
country depended upon application of federal law, 
and resolution of that question raised issues of 
importance pertaining to relationship of the United 
States to its Indian wards. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153. 
[2] Indians €=^38(2) 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Question of whether place where a crime committed 
by an unemancipated member of an Indian tribe was 
part of an Indian reservation and therefore Indian 
country within statute defining Indian country for 
purposes of exclusive jurisdiction, depended upon 
interpretation and application of federal law. 18 
U.S.C.A. §§1151, 1153. 
[3] Indians €=^16.10(1) 
209kl6.10(l) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32) 
Purpose of 1906 Act providing for sale of mineral 
lands and for settlement and entry under homestead 
laws of other surplus lands remaining on diminished 
Colville Indian Reservation was neither to destroy 
existence of the diminished reservation nor to lessen 
federal responsibility for and jurisdiction over 
Indians having tribal rights on that reservation, and 
such act did no more than open way for non-Indian 
settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner 
which federal government regarded as beneficial to 
development of its wards. Act March 22, 1906, §§ 1 
et seq., 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82. 
[4] Indians €=>12 
209kl2 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Indians €=^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Act of 1906 providing for sale of mineral lands and 
for settlement and entry under homestead laws of 
other surplus land remaining on diminished Colville 
Indian Reservation did not dissolve such 
reservation, but the reservation remains in existence 
and therefore state of Washington did not have 
jurisdiction over offense of burglary committed on 
such reservation by an enrolled, unemancipated 
member of the Colville Indian Tribe. Act March 
22, 1906, §§ 1 et seq., 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82. 
[5] Indians €==>36 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
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A burglary offense committed on land within limits 
of an Indian reservation was committed within 
"Indian country", within exclusive jurisdiction 
statute, even if the particular parcel of land upon 
which the offense was committed was held under a 
patent in fee by a non-Indian. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151 
, 1153. 
[6] Indians €=^32(1) 
209k32(l) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32) 
Words "notwithstanding issuance of any patent", 
within definition of Indian country as including all 
land within limits of any Indian reservation under 
jurisdiction of the federal government, 
notwithstanding issuance of any patent, means that 
patented lands should not be excluded from an 
Indian reservation regardless of whether the patents 
are issued to Indians or non-Indians. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
§ 1151, 1153. 
[7] Indians €^>36 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
Fact that land on which an attempted burglary was 
committed by an Indian was located within a town 
laid out by the federal government, within limits of 
an Indian reservation, and that such town-site plot 
was filed for record in county of a state, did not 
mean that such territory was not Indian country, 
within statute defining Indian country for purposes 
of exclusive jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 
1153. 
[8] Indians €=^12 
209k 12 Most Cited Cases 
When Congress has once established an Indian 
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a 
part of the reservation until separated therefrom by 
Congress. 
[9] Indians €^38(2) 
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases 
Courts of the state of Washington had no 
jurisdiction to try an enrolled, unemancipated 
member of the Colville Indian Tribe for burglary, 
where land upon which burglary allegedly occurred 
was located within limits of the Colville Indian 
Reservation. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1153. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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**425 *351 Glen A. Wilkinson, Washington, D.C., 
for petitioner. Claron C. Spencer was with him on 
the briefs. 
*352 Stephen C. Way, Olympia, Wash., for 
respondent. 
Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The petitioner Paul Seymour was charged with 
burglary b> the State of Washington in the Superior 
Court of Okanogan County and pleaded guilty to 
the lesser included offense of attempted burglary. 
Upon this plea he was convicted and sentenced to 
serve seven and one-half years in the state 
penitentiary. Later, he commenced this proceeding 
by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
State Supreme Court urging that his state conviction 
was void for want of jurisdiction on the grounds 
that he was an enrolled, unemancipated member of 
the Colville Indian Tribe and therefore a ward of 
the United States; that the 'purported crime' of 
burglary for which he had been convicted was 
committed in 'Indian country' as defined in 18 
U.S.C. s 1151, 18 U.S.C.A. s 1151; [FN1] and that 
burglary committed by an Indian in Indian country 
is an offense 'within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States' under 18 U.S.C. s 1153, 18 U.S.C.A. 
s 1153. [FN2] Since the petition, return and answer 
raised issues of fact, the State Supreme Court 
referred the matter to the original trial court to 
determine (1) whether petitioner was a member of 
the Colville Tribe, and (2) whether the offense was 
*353 committed in Indian country. After hearings, 
the trial court upheld petitioner's claim of **426 
membership in the Colville Tribe, but rejected his 
contention that the burglary upon which the state 
conviction was based had occurred in Indian 
country. 
FN1. 62 Stat. 757, as amended, 63 Stat. 94. 
FN2. 'Any Indian who commits against the 
person or property of another Indian or 
other person any of the following offenses, 
namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, 
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault 
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with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, 
robbery, and larceny within the Indian 
country, shall be subject to the same laws 
and penalties as all other persons 
committing any of the above offenses, 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States.' 62 Stat. 758. 
The trial court's conclusion that the crime did not 
take place in Indian country was not based upon any 
factual doubt as to the precise place where the 
burglary occurred for that fact was undisputed. Nor 
did that conclusion rest upon any uncertainty as to 
the proper definition of the term 'Indian country' for 
the court expressly recognized the applicability of s 
1151 which defines the term to include 'all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation * * *.' Rather, the trial court's 
conclusion rested solely upon its holding that, 
although the land upon which the burglary occurred 
had once been within the limits of an Indian 
reservation, that reservation had since been 
dissolved and the land in question restored to the 
public domain. 
[1][2] Agreeing with the trial court, the State 
Supreme Court then denied the petition for habeas 
corpus, [FN3] holding as it previously had in State 
ex rel. Best v. Superior Court, [FN4] that 'What is 
still known as the south half of the diminished 
Colville Indian reservation is no longer an Indian 
reservation.' Since the question of whether the 
place where the crime occurred is a part of an 
Indian reservation and therefore Indian country 
within the meaning of ss 1151 and 1153 depends 
upon the interpretation and application of federal 
law, and since the resolution of that question as 
presented in this case raises issues of importance 
pertaining *354 to this country's relationship to its 
Indian wards, we granted certiorari. [FN5] 
FN3. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash.2d 
109, 346P.2d669. 
FN4. 107 Wash. 238, 241, 181 P. 688, 689. 
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FN5. 365 U.S. 833, 81 S.Ct. 749, 5 
L.Ed.2d743. 
The case turns upon the current status of the 
Colville Indian Reservation~a reservation created 
in 1872 by Executive Order of President Grant 
which declared that 'the country bounded on the 
east and south by the Columbia River, on the west 
by the Okanagan River, and on the north by the 
British possessions, be, and the same is hereby, set 
apart as a reservation for' the Colville Indians. [FN6] 
In 1892, the size of this reservation was 
diminished when Congress passed an Act providing 
that, subject to reservations and allotments made to 
individual Colville Indians, about one-half of the 
original Colville reservation, since commonly 
referred to as the 'North Half,' should be 'vacated 
and restored to the public domain * * *.' [FN7] This 
Act did not, however, purport to affect the status of 
the remaining part of the reservation, since known 
as the 'South Half or the 'diminished Colville Indian 
Reservation,' but instead expressly reaffirmed that 
this South Half was 'still reserved by the 
Government for their (the Colville Indians') use and 
occupancy.' [FN8] Since the burglary of which 
petitioner was convicted occurred on land within 
the South Half, it is clear that state jurisdiction over 
the offense charged, if it is to be found at all, must 
be based upon some federal action subsequent to 
the 1892 Act. 
FN6. I Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and 
Treaties (2d ed.), p. 916. 
FN7. 27 Stat. 62, 63. 
FN8. 27 Stat, at page 64. 
The Washington courts found authority for the 
assertion of state jurisdiction in a 1906 Act of 
Congress [FN9] implemented by a 1916 
Presidential Proclamation. [FN 10] The 1906 Act 
provided for the sale of mineral lands and *355 for 
the settlement and entry under the homestead laws 
of other **427 surplus lands remaining on the 
diminished Colville Reservation after allotments 
were first made and patents issued for 80 acres of 
land to 'each man, woman, and child' either 
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'belonging to or having tribal relations on said 
Colville Indian Reservation * * *.' The 1916 
Presidential Proclamation issued pursuant to this 
Act simply prescribed the method for disposal of 
surplus lands under the homestead laws as the 1906 
Act had authorized. The Washington courts viewed 
this 1906 Act and the 1916 Presidential 
Proclamation as completely wiping out the South 
Half of the Colville Reservation in precisely the 
same manner as the 1892 Act had Vacated and 
restored' the North Half of the reservation 'to the 
public domain.' Upon careful consideration, 
however, we cannot agree with that conclusion for it 
has no support in the language of the 1906 Act and 
ignores important differences between that Act and 
the provisions of the 1892 Act restoring the North 
Half of the reservation to the public domain. 
FN9. 34 Stat. 80. 
FN10.39Stat. 1778. 
[3] Nowhere in the 1906 Act is there to be found 
any language similar to that in the 1892 Act 
expressly vacating the South Half of the reservation 
and restoring that land to the public domain. Quite 
the contrary, the 1906 Act repeatedly refers to the 
Colville Reservation in a manner that makes it clear 
that the intention of Congress was that the 
reservation should continue to exist as such. [FN11] 
Moreover, the 1906 Act, unlike the 1892 Act, 
provides that the proceeds from the disposition of 
lands affected by its provisions shall be 'deposited 
in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of 
the Colville and confederated tribes of Indians 
belonging and having tribal rights on the Colville 
Indian Reservation, in the State of Washington * * 
*.' The 1892 Act had provided for congressional 
power to appropriate the net proceeds *356 from 
the sale and disposition of lands in the North Half 
of the original reservation for the general public 
use. Consequently, it seems clear that the purpose 
of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy the existence 
of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation nor to 
lessen federal responsibility for and jurisdiction 
over the Indians having tribal rights on that 
reservation. The Act did no more than open the way 
for non-Indian settlers to own land on the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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reservation in a manner which the Federal 
Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the 
Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development 
of its wards. 
FN11. See ss 2, 3, 6 and 12, 34 Stat, at 
pages 80-82. 
[4] That this is the proper construction of the 1906 
Act finds support in subsequent congressional 
treatment of the reservation. Time and time again in 
statutes enacted since 1906, Congress has explicitly 
recognized the continued existence as a federal 
Indian reservation of this South Half or diminished 
Colville Indian Reservation. [FN 12] As recently as 
1956, Congress enacted a statute which provides 
that 'the undisposed-of lands of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, Washington, dealt with by the Act of 
March 22, 1906 (34 Stat. 80), are hereby restored to 
tribal ownership to be held in trust by the United 
States to the same extent as all other tribal lands on 
the existing reservation, subject to any existing 
valid rights.' [FN13] *357 (Emphasis supplied.) 
**428 This same construction of the 1906 Act has 
been adopted by the Department of Interior, the 
agency of government having primary responsibility 
for Indian affairs. [FN 14] And the Solicitor 
General has urged this construction upon the Court 
in this very case. We therefore conclude that the 
Washington courts erred in holding that the 1906 
Act dissolved the Colville Indian Reservation 
because it seems clear that this reservation is still in 
existence. 
FN12. See, e.g., 39 Stat. 123, 154-155; 39 
Stat. 672; 40 Stat. 449; 41 Stat. 535; 43 
Stat. 21; 54 Stat. 703, 16 U.S.C.A. s 835d 
et seq.; 69 Stat. 141, 143; 70 Stat. 
626-627. Two of these statutes, 40 Stat. 
449 passed in 1918 and 41 Stat. 535 
passed in 1920, do illustrate that there may 
have been some congressional confusion 
on this issue during that short period of 
time for they referred to the 'former 
Colville Indian Reservation, Washington.' 
FN13. 70 Stat. 626-627. It is also 
significant that s 5 of this 1956 Act, while 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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recognizing the continued existence of the 
Colville Reservation contained a provision 
looking towards 'the termination of Federal 
supervision over the property and affairs of 
the Confederated Tribes and their 
members * * *' within a reasonable time. 
This Act followed closely a 1953 Act, 67 
Stat. 588, 590, s 7 of which, 28 U.S.C.A. s 
1360 note, provided a way in which the 
State of Washington could acquire 
jurisdiction over the reservation by 
meeting certain conditions prescribed there 
by Congress. See Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, 222, note 10, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 
L.Ed.2d 251. These conditions have not as 
yet been met with respect to the Colville 
Reservation. 
FN14. See, e.g., 54 I.D. 559; 59 I.D. 147; 
60I.D. 318. 
[5] Counsel for the State of Washington present 
two alternative contentions which, if sound, would 
sustain the jurisdiction of the State over the land 
here in question even if the Act of 1906 did not 
completely dissolve the reservation in the manner 
held by the Washington courts. The first of these 
rests upon the assertion that the particular parcel of 
land upon which this burglary was committed is 
held under a patent in fee by a non-Indian. The 
contention is that, even though the reservation was 
not dissolved completely by the Act permitting 
non-Indian settlers to come upon it, its limits would 
be diminished by the actual purchase of land within 
it by non-Indians because land owned in fee by 
non-Indians cannot be said to be reserved for 
Indians. This contention is not entirely implausible 
on its face and, indeed, at one time had the support 
of distinguished commentators on Indian Law. 
[FN 15] But the issue has since been squarely put to 
rest by congressional enactment of the currently 
prevailing definition of Indian country in s 1151 to 
include 'all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction *358 of the 
United States government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent * * *.' 
FN15. See, e.g., Cohen, Handbook of 
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Federal Indian Law, 359 (1942). Of course 
this work was compiled before the 1948 
amendment which enacted the present 
definition of Indian country as set out in 18 
U.S.C. s 1151, 18 U.S.C.A. s 1151. 
[6] The State urges that we interpret the words 
'notwithstanding the issuance of any patent' to mean 
only notwithstanding the issuance of any patent to 
an Indian. But the State does not suggest, nor can 
we find, any adequate justification for such an 
interpretation. Quite the contrary, it seems to us 
that the strongest argument against the exclusion of 
patented lands from an Indian reservation applies 
with equal force to patents issued to non-Indians 
and Indians alike. For that argument rests upon the 
fact that where the existence or nonexistence of an 
Indian reservation, and therefore the existence or 
nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon 
the ownership of particular parcels of land, law 
enforcement officers operating in the area will find 
it necessary to search tract books in order to 
determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each 
particular offense, even though committed within 
the reservation, is in the State or Federal 
Government. [FN 16] Such an impractical pattern 
of checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the 
plain language of s 1151 and we see no justification 
for adopting an unwarranted construction of that 
language where the result would be merely to 
recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to 
avoid. 
FN 16. Objection to the possibility of such 
an administratively unworkable 
distribution of criminal jurisdiction has 
been voiced by the Solicitor of the 
Department of Interior. 61 I.D. 298, 304. 
And see United States v. Frank Black 
Spotted Horse, 8 Cir., 282 F. 349, 353-
354. 
[7] The second alternative contention pressed by 
the State of Washington rests **429 upon the fact 
that the land on which the burglary occurred is 
located within the governmental townsite of Omak, 
a town laid out by the Federal Government pursuant 
to authority granted in s 11 of the 1906 Act. The 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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plot was filed for record in Okanogan County, *359 
all the lands encompassed within the townsite were END OF DOCUMENT 
thereby dedicated to the public interest and, since 
this dedication to the public is inconsistent with any 
reservation for the Indians, all these lands became 
subject to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by 
the courts of Washington. This contention is 
nothing more than a variation of the State's first 
alternative contention for it simply attempts to make 
a special case for excluding from a reservation 
lands owned by towns as opposed to lands owned 
by individual non-Indians. The arguments which 
led us to reject the State's first alternative 
contention, though present only with somewhat less 
force here, are nonetheless entirely adequate to 
require the same answer to this contention. 
Moreover, the State can point to no language in s 
1151's definition of Indian country which lends the 
slightest support to the idea that by creating a 
townsite within an Indian reservation the Federal 
Government lessens the scope of its responsibility 
for the Indians living on that reservation. 
[8] [9] In United States v. Celestine, [FN 17] this 
Court said that 'when Congress has once 
established a reservation, all tracts included within 
it remain a part of the reservation until separated 
therefrom by Congress.' We are unable to find 
where Congress has taken away from the Colville 
Indians any part of the land within the boundaries of 
the area which has been recognized as their 
reservation since 1892. Since the burglary with 
which petitioner was charged occurred on property 
plainly located within the limits of that reservation, 
the courts of Washington had no jurisdiction to try 
him for that offense. 
FN17. 215 U.S. 278, 285, 30 S.Ct. 93, 95, 
54 L.Ed. 195. 
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court 
denying petitioner's plea for a writ of habeas corpus 
is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, 
v. 
Nelson E. "Buck" SANFORD et al., Appellees. 
No. 73-3016. 
Dec. 23, 1976. 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, James F. Battin, J., dismissed an 
indictment against defendants charging game law 
violations and the Court of Appeals, 503 F.2d 291, 
dismissed a Government appeal. The Supreme 
Court, 421 U.S. 996, 95 S.Ct. 2392, 44 L.Ed.2d 663, 
vacated the dismissal. A subsequent order of the 
Court of Appeals, 536 F.2d 871, again dismissing 
the appeal, was reversed by the Supreme Court, 97 
S.Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17. On remand, the Court of 
Appeals, Sneed, Circuit Judge, held that the statutes 
prohibiting trespass on Indian reservations for 
hunting and fishing and prohibiting hunting in 
Yellowstone National Park applied to hunting 
guides; that if government undercover agents were 
not authorized by Montana officials to violate that 
state's game laws in attempting to gain evidence 
against defendants, interstate transportation of 
animals killed by the agents in violation of Montana 
law could constitute a violation of the Lacey Act; 
and that the defendants could be convicted of 
conspiring to transport in interstate commerce parts 
of the dead bodies of illegally killed animals. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Indians €=^36 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
Participation of government undercover agents in 
illegal hunting on Indian reservation did not make 
lawful what would otherwise be unlawful trespass 
by hunting guides accompanying undercover agents. 
18U.S.C.A. §1165. 
upon Indian reservation 
or fishing extended to 
[2] Indians €^>36 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
Statute prohibiting going 
for purpose of hunting 
activities of hunting guides. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165. 
[3] Indians € ^ 3 6 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
Statute prohibiting going upon Indian reservation 
for purpose of hunting or fishing did not make 
illegal unauthorized killing of wildlife on Indian 
reservations and thus could not serve as predicate 
offense for conviction under Lacey Act, which 
prohibited transportation of wildlife killed in 
violation of federal laws. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 1165. 
[4] Indians € ^ 3 6 
209k36 Most Cited Cases 
Montana game laws apply to activities of 
non-Indians on Indian reservations. 
[5] Game €=^7 
187k7 Most Cited Cases 
Montana statute prohibiting hunting and fishing out 
of season did not apply to activities of hunting 
guides. R.C.M.1947, § 26-307(3). 
[6] Criminal Law €=^36.6 
110k36.6 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k36.5, 110k31) 
Federal Government's authorization of undercover 
agents to violate federal game laws for purposes of 
gathering evidence of game law violations by 
hunting guides did not immunize undercover agents 
from force and effect of state game laws. 
[7] Constitutional Law €=>257.5 
92k257.5 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k257) 
Government undercover agents' participation in 
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illegal hunting expedition to gain evidence of game 
law violations by hunting guides did not violate due 
process. 
[8] Game €=>7 
187k7 Most Cited Cases 
If federal undercover agents were not authorized by 
Montana officials to violate that state's game laws in 
attempting to gather evidence of federal game law 
violations by hunting guides, interstate 
transportation of wildlife illegally killed in Montana 
by undercover agents could violate Lacey Act. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 43; R.C.M.1947, §§ 26-904, 26-906. 
[9] Game €=^7 
187k7 Most Cited Cases 
Statute prohibiting hunting in Yellowstone National 
Park applied to activities of hunting guides as well 
as hunters themselves. Yellowstone National Park 
Act of 1894, § 4, 16 U.S.C.A. § 26. 
[10] Conspiracy €=^28(3) 
91k28(3) Most Cited Cases 
If hunting guides, on belief that federal undercover 
agents were bona fide hunters, conspired to 
transport in interstate commerce parts of animals 
killed in violation of federal law by undercover 
agents, hunting guides could be convicted of 
conspiracy, notwithstanding ultimate success or 
failure of planned scheme. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 371. 
[11] Conspiracy €==>27 
91k27 Most Cited Cases 
It is not necessary that overt acts in furtherance of 
conspiracy be criminal in nature. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 
*1086 Keith L. Burrowes, Asst. U. S. Atty. 
(argued), Billings, Mont., for appellant. 
Ralph S. Wright and D. Frank Kampfe (argued), of 
Sandall, Moses & Cavan, Billings, Mont., for 
appellees. 
Before MERRILL, TRASK and SNEED, Circuit 
Judges. 
SNEED, Circuit Judge: 
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This opinion marks the third time we have sought 
to dispose of this case. Trial on a seven-count 
indictment against Nelson Sanford and his sons, 
Rodney, Lon and Rick Sanford began on February 
5, 1973. A mistrial resulted by reason of a hung 
jury. The district court then granted the Sanfords' 
motion to dismiss the indictment, and the 
Government appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3731 
from the grant of this motion. We originally held 
that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
because the double jeopardy clause prohibited 
further prosecution. 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to us "for 
further consideration in the light of Serfass v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 377, (95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 
L.Ed.2d 265) (1975)." 421 U.S. 996, 95 S.Ct. 2392, 
44 L.Ed.2d 663 (1975). On remand, we adhered to 
our prior determination. 536 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 
1976). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit further 
prosecution, and remanded the case to us for a 
decision on the merits of the district court's 
dismissal of the indictment. — U.S. -—, 97 S.Ct. 
20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976). We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings on all seven counts. 
Because of the rather unique facts presented in this 
case, a full statement of the allegations set forth in 
the indictment is necessary. Well-pleaded factual 
allegations are assumed to be true. 
The Sanfords are engaged in the business of 
outfitting and guiding big game hunts in Montana. 
Rodney Sanford telephoned Paul Bagalio at 
Bagalio's home in Vermont on December 22, 1971. 
During this conversation, Rodney offered his 
services as a guide for late season elk and Rocky 
Mountain Big Horn sheep hunting in Montana. A 
second conversation to the same effect was held on 
December 29 at which time the hunts at issue in this 
case were arranged. Subsequently, Bagalio 
telephoned Rodney and obtained permission to 
bring along Bruce Parker, who Bagalio described as 
"a friend and business associate." 
The Sanfords were unaware that both Bagalio and 
Parker were acting in undercover capacities for the 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and were 
authorized by federal officials to do whatever was 
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necessary to complete their investigations.[FN 1] 
FN1. Although the facts as alleged in the 
indictment do not indicate that Bagalio and 
Parker were acting in undercover 
capacities, the Government concedes that 
they were authorized by federal officials 
"to do whatever necessary to complete 
their investigation." It is therefore 
appropriate to consider this authorization 
in testing the sufficiency of the indictment. 
See, e. g., United States v. Thompson, 202 
F.Supp. 503 (N.D.CaL, 1962). Appellees 
and the district court indicated that a 
similar authorization was made by 
appropriate officials of the State of 
Montana; however, there is no indication 
in the Record that the Government has 
stipulated the nature, scope and extent of 
state authorization. 
Bagalio and Parker arrived in Montana early in 
January 1972. On January 6, they were transported 
by Lon, Rick and Rodney Sanford from Bridger, 
Montana to Greybull, Wyoming, where they 
secured lodging *1087 for the night. The next 
morning, the party of five boarded a helicopter and 
were transported to the Crow Indian Reservation in 
Montana. At this time, they penetrated the 
boundaries of the Reservation in search of elk.[FN2] 
Parker, at the direction of Rodney Sanford, shot at 
and knocked down a bull elk; the coup de grace was 
administered by Rodney Sanford. Shortly 
thereafter, Rick Sanford returned by helicopter and 
transported the party and the cape of the elk from 
the Reservation back to Greybull, Wyoming. The 
cape was then carried by Lon, Rick and Rodney 
Sanford to Bridger, Montana. Bagalio and Parker 
apparently joined the Sanfords in Montana on 
January 10. 
FN2. Rick, who had left in the helicopter, 
and Nelson Sanford were not with the 
party. 
A second hunt was planned but first postponed 
because of inclement weather. The expedition 
finally got under way on February 2, 1972. At this 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
time, Bagalio, Parker and Rodney Sanford again 
penetrated the exterior boundaries of the Crow 
Indian Reservation. At the direction of Rodney 
Sanford, Bagalio shot and killed a second elk. 
Rodney caped the elk, and the party, leaving the 
carcass behind, left the Reservation. 
Within the next five days, Rodney Sanford guided 
Bagalio and Parker on a hunt for Rocky Mountain 
Big Horn sheep. Rodney led the party into 
Yellowstone National Park, where he pointed out a 
sheep for Bagalio to shoot. Bagalio shot and killed 
the sheep. Rodney removed the cape, head and 
horns from the sheep, leaving the carcass where it 
fell. 
[1] A seven-count indictment was returned against 
the Sanfords. In Count I Nelson, Rodney, Lon and 
Rick were charged under 18 U.S.C. ss 2, 43, and 
371 with conspiracy to transport in interstate 
commerce animals killed in violation of R.C.M. s 
26-307(3) and 16 U.S.C. s 26. Count III charged 
Lon and Rodney Sanford with the January 8 illegal 
entry on the Crow Indian Reservation, 18 U.S.C. s 
1165, and further charged Nelson and Rick Sanford 
with aiding and abetting the commission of the 
offense, 18 U.S.C. s 2. Count III charged Rodney 
Sanford for a similar offense with respect to the 
February 2 entry onto the Crow Indian Reservation; 
Nelson, Rick and Lon Sanford were charged with 
aiding and abetting this offense. Count IV charged 
Rodney Sanford with illegal hunting within 
Yellowstone National Park, 16 U.S.C. s 26. The 
remaining three counts concerned alleged violations 
of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. s 43. In Count V, 
Rodney, Lon and Rick were charged with interstate 
transportation of the elk killed on January 8; the elk 
was said to have been killed in violation of federal, 
18 U.S.C. s 1165, and state, R.C.M. s 26-307(3), 
laws. Count VI made the same charge against 
Rodney Sanford with respect to the elk killed on 
February 2. Finally, Count VII made an identical 
charge against Nelson Sanford for the transportation 
of parts of the bodies of the two dead elk from 
Billings, Montana, to Seattle, Washington; Rodney, 
Lon and Rick Sanford were charged with aiding and 
abetting the commission of this offense. 
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Our consideration of the sufficiency of the 
indictment will focus: first, on Counts II and III, 
relating to the alleged trespass on the Crow Indian 
Reservation; second, on Counts V, VI and VII, 
relating to the alleged violations of the Lacey Act; 
third, on Count IV, relating to hunting within 
Yellowstone National Park; and, fourth, on Count I, 
relating to conspiracy to transport illegally killed 
animals in interstate commerce. 
Counts II and III: Trespass on Crow Indian 
Reservation. 
Turning to the portions of the indictment charging 
appellees with illegal trespass on the Crow Indian 
Reservation, 18 U.S.C. s 1165 proscribes 
unauthorized entry onto an Indian reservation for 
the purpose of hunting, trapping, or removal of 
game.[FN3] *1088 The district court dismissed 
Counts II and III on the ground that the trespass was 
effectively authorized by Bagalio and Parker. We 
disagree. 
FN3. "Whoever, without lawful authority 
or permission, willfully and knowingly 
goes upon any land that belongs to any 
Indian or Indian tribe . . . and either are 
held by the United States in trust or are 
subject to a restriction against alienation 
imposed by the United States, or upon any 
lands of the United States that are reserved 
for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting, 
trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the 
removal of game, peltries, or fish 
therefrom, shall be fined not more than 
$200 or imprisoned not more than ninety 
days, or both, and all game, fish, and 
peltries in his possession shall be 
forfeited." 18 U.S.C. s 1165. 
We need not pass on the authority of the federal 
agents to enter the Crow Reservation under the facts 
alleged in this case, for even assuming that the entry 
of Bagalio and Parker was lawful, we find nothing 
in these facts which would warrant a conclusion 
either that the agents could lawfully authorize 
appellees to enter the Reservation or that in fact 
such authorization was given. The facts as set forth 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
in the indictment suggest that the Sanfords were the 
prime motivating force in the entry and that Bagalio 
and Parker did little more than follow the 
instructions of their guides. The participation of the 
undercover agents in the adventure does not, as the 
district court suggests, constitute an authorization 
nor in any other manner make lawful what would 
otherwise be an unlawful trespass by appellees. See 
United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
[2] We are also unable to accept the argument that 
18 U.S.C. s 1165 does not extend to the activities of 
guides, who presumably are not actively engaged in 
the shooting of animals. On the contrary, the statute 
is written in the broadest possible terms and was 
designed to prevent encroachments on Indian lands 
of the type presented in this case. It would clearly 
violate the intent of Congress to read the statute as 
not governing the entries of hunting guides. 
Counts V, VI and VII: Interstate Transportation of 
Animals Killed in Violation of Federal and State 
Law. 
Appellees are charged under the Lacey Act, 18 
U.S.C. s 43, with three counts of interstate 
transportation of illegally killed animals: Count V 
charges Rodney, Lon and Rick Sanford with 
interstate transportation of "parts of the dead elk 
killed on January 8, 1972; Count VI charges 
Rodney Sanford with interstate transportation of 
"parts of the dead elk killed on February 2, 1972; 
Count VII charges Nelson Sanford with interstate 
transportation of the above from Billings, Montana 
to Seattle, Washington, and further charges the 
remaining Sanfords with aiding and abetting the 
transportation. [FN4] 
FN4. No Lacey Act charges are made with 
respect to the Rocky Mountain Big Horn 
sheep killed in Yellowstone National Park. 
The Lacey Act proscribes the transportation of 
wildlife killed in violation of federal laws and the 
interstate transportation of wildlife killed in 
violation of state laws.[FN5] Thus, the inquiry 
under this portion of the indictment is directed to 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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whether the elk which were transported were killed 
in violation of either federal or state laws. 
FN5. 18 U.S.C. s 43 provides, inter alia: 
(a) Any person who 
(1) delivers, carries, transports, or ships, 
by any means whatever, or causes to be 
delivered, carried, transported, or shipped 
for commercial or noncommercial 
purposes or sells or causes to be sold any 
wildlife taken, transported, or sold in any 
manner in violation of any Act of Congress 
or regulation issued thereunder, or (2) 
delivers, carries, transports, or ships, by 
any means whatever, or causes to be 
delivered, carried, transported, or shipped 
for commercial or noncommercial 
purposes or sells or causes to be sold in 
interstate or foreign commerce any wildlife 
taken, transported, or sold in any manner 
in violation of any law or regulation of any 
State or foreign country;... 
(f) For the purpose of this section, the term 
(5) "taken" means captured, 
collected, or otherwise possessed. 
killed, 
[3] To establish an illegal killing under federal law, 
the Government urges that 18 U.S.C. s 1165 makes 
illegal the unauthorized killing of wildlife on Indian 
reservations. We disagree and find persuasive the 
reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court: 
*1089 It is significant to note that section 1165 
does not directly prohibit hunting and fishing but 
makes the act of going upon the Indian 
reservation a violation if done for the purpose of 
hunting or fishing . . . (S)ection 1165 must be 
considered to be a statute providing a penalty for 
trespass to an Indian reservation and not an 
attempt by Congress to enter the field of fish and 
game regulation. 
State v. Danielson, 
(1967). 
Mont., 427 P.2d 689, 691 
[4] Turning to state law, the Government also 
argues that the elk were killed in violation of the 
Montana fish and game law, R.C.M. s 26-307(3). 
This, of course raises the preliminary issue of 
whether the Montana game laws apply to the 
activities of non-Indians on Indian reservations. 
We hold that they do. In reaching this 
determination, we again accept as a correct 
statement of the law the decision of the Montana 
Supreme Court in State v. Danielson, supra, 
wherein it was noted that: 
(T)he State of Montana has jurisdiction to enforce 
its fish and game regulations on Indian 
reservations contained within its boundaries with 
respect to persons who are not tribal Indians 
unless precluded from doing so by an act of 
Congress or unless such enforcement would 
interfere with self-government on the reservation. 
427 P.2d at 692-93. 
As mentioned above, 18 U.S.C. s 1165 does not 
represent an attempt by the federal government to 
enter the arena of fish and game regulation on 
Indian reservations; thus, the federal statute cannot 
be viewed as a prohibiting or conflicting act. 
Further, we are convinced that the application of 
Montana game laws to the activities of non-Indians 
on Indian reservations does not interfere with tribal 
self-government on reservations. We express no 
opinion concerning the possible concurrent 
application of tribal law to non-Indians on Indian 
reservations under the circumstances of this case. 
[5] Having determined that the Montana game laws 
are applicable, the issue becomes whether the elk 
were killed in violation of R.C.M. s 26-307(3), 
[FN6] which provides: 
FN6. In neither its briefs nor during oral 
argument did the Government choose to 
argue that other provisions of the Montana 
fish and game laws may be applicable to 
the activities of the Sanfords. Thus, 
although Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 7(c)(3) provides that omission 
of a statutory citation is not per se grounds 
for dismissal of the indictment, we decline 
to review the Montana Code in a search for 
possible violations when the Government 
places sole reliance on R.C.M. s 
26-307(3). 
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It shall be unlawful and a misdemeanor for any 
person during the closed season on any species of 
game animal, game bird or fish to take, hunt, 
shoot, kill or capture any such game animal or 
such game bird or to fish for or catch any such 
fish. 
Turning first to the activities of appellees, it is our 
view that R.C.M. s 26- 307(3) was not designed to 
reach the activities of hunting guides. We reach this 
conclusion because of the existence of a separate 
provision of the Montana Code, R.C.M. s 26-906, 
dealing specifically with activities of outfitters and 
guides. This section provides: 
Any person accompanying a hunting or fishing 
party as an outfitter or agent or employee of such 
outfitter shall be equally responsible with any 
person or party employing him as an outfitter for 
any violation of the law; any such outfitter or 
employee of such outfitter, who shall willfully fail 
to or refuse to report any violation of the law, 
shall be liable to the penalties as herein provided. 
The definition of "outfitter" offered in R.C.M. s 
26-904 [FN7] makes it clear that the *1090 
Government is incorrect in its contention that the 
Sanfords engaged in off-season hunting within the 
meaning of R.C.M. s 26- 307(3). Thus, the 
indictment fails to allege facts sufficient to establish 
a violation of R.C.M. s 26-307(3) by the Sanfords. 
FN7. R.C.M. s 26-904 defines "outfitter" 
as follows: 
For the purpose of this act, the word 
'outfitter' shall mean any person . . . who 
shall engage in the business of outfitting 
for hunting or fishing parties, as the term is 
commonly understood, who shall for 
consideration provide any saddle or pack 
animal or animals or personal service for 
hunting or fishing parties, camping 
equipment, vehicles or other conveyance 
except boats for any person or persons to 
hunt, trap, capture, take or kill any game, . 
. . or who shall aid or assist any person or 
persons in locating or pursuing any game 
animal. 
[6] [7] [8] But this does not end the inquiry, for if it 
is established that Bagalio and Parker violated 
R.C.M. s 26-307(3), then the violation of state law 
necessary for a Lacey Act prosecution will be 
established. [FN8] The issue is thus narrowed to a 
consideration of whether Bagalio and Parker were 
lawfully and properly authorized by state officials 
to kill the elk in question; [FN9] if such 
authorization is present, then R.C.M. s 26-307(3) 
was not violated and the Lacey Act counts of the 
indictment must be dismissed for failure to establish 
a violation of state law. Authorization by federal 
officials will not serve as authorization by state 
officials. This follows from the fact that Congress 
has not attempted to enact game laws for Indian 
reservations in Montana. Under these 
circumstances federal authorization cannot 
immunize federal officials from the force and effect 
of Montana game laws. 
FN8. Under the circumstances here 
presented, the commission of the state law 
violation by undercover agents does not 
change the result. The extent of the state 
involvement in the crimes does not rise to 
the outrageous level contemplated in 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 
491, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1650, 48 L.Ed.2d 113; 
(Powell, J., concurring); id. 425 U.S. 484, 
495, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1652, (Brennan, J , 
dissenting) and consequently does not 
violate due process. The case is analogous 
to those in which the Government agents 
supply contraband to an ongoing criminal 
enterprise. "(S)uch conduct falls well 
within the bounds sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court in Hampton." United v. 
Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 
1976). Compare Greene v. United States, 
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). 
FN9. We are aware of no Montana cases 
holding that authorization by proper state 
officials may vitiate what would otherwise 
be an illegal killing by state agents acting 
in undercover capacities. The Montana 
Fish and Game Commission is, however, 
vested with the responsibility of 
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supervising fish and wildlife within the 
state. The broad responsibilities given to 
the Commission include the power to 
enforce the game laws of the state, R.C.M. 
s 26-104(2), fix general and special 
seasons and bag limits, R.C.M. s 26-104.3, 
and establish game refuges, R.C.M. s 
26-104.8. Most importantly, the 
Commission "possesses all powers 
necessary to fulfill the duties prescribed by 
law." R.C.M. s 26-104(1). Although the 
Commission has not been granted express 
authority to create special exceptions for 
law enforcement purposes, the broad 
powers enumerated above strongly suggest 
that it may authorize limited off-season 
shootings by government officials if 
essential to the performance of a legitimate 
law enforcement function. 
While the indictment is silent on the question of 
state and federal authorizations in this case, the 
Government has conceded the extent of federal 
authorization, but no similar stipulation has been 
made with respect to state authorization. Thus, 
remand on the Lacey Act counts of the indictment is 
necessary. If on remand it is determined that state 
authorization was lawfully effected, Counts V, VI 
and VII should be dismissed. 
Count IV: Hunting in Yellowstone National Park. 
[9] Rodney Sanford is charged with illegal hunting 
of Rocky Mountain Big Horn sheep within the 
confines of Yellowstone National Park. 16 U.S.C. s 
26 provides, inter alia: 
All hunting, or the killing, wounding, or capturing 
at any time of any bird or wild animal, except 
dangerous animals, when it is necessary to 
prevent them from destroying human life or 
inflicting an injury, is prohibited within the limits 
of said park; — 
The parties devoted considerable attention in their 
briefs and during oral arguments to the issue of 
whether Bagalio acted lawfully in shooting and 
killing the sheep. In our view, this is a misstatement 
of the issue; the appropriate inquiry is instead 
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whether the language "all hunting, or the killing, 
wounding, or capturing . . . of any bird or wild 
animal" encompasses the activities of Rodney 
Sanford within Yellowstone Park. More 
particularly, the issue is whether 16 U.S.C. s 26 
covers the activities *1091 of hunting guides as well 
as hunters themselves.[FN 10] We hold that it does. 
FN 10. Appellants again argue that 
authorization from proper federal officials 
vitiates what would otherwise be illegal 
acts. Again, we must disagree. There is 
nothing in the facts alleged in the 
indictment which even remotely suggests 
that the authorization, if it existed, 
extended to the activities of Rodney 
Sanford. Nor may there be said to be an 
implied authorization extending from 
Bagalio and Parker to Rodney Sanford, 
for, as we noted above, the mere presence 
of undercover agents does not vitiate what 
would otherwise be illegal conduct. 
We begin our consideration by noting the broad 
language of 16 U.S.C. s 26, which clearly 
proscribes two sets of activities: (1) hunting; and (2) 
killing, wounding, or capturing of animals. Rodney 
Sanford neither killed, wounded nor captured the 
sheep; the inquiry is thus whether he "hunted" 
within the meaning of the statute. It is our view 
that, given the broad wording and purposes of the 
statute, the term "hunting" refers to at least two 
types of activities. The first of these, which is not 
applicable to the activities of Rodney Sanford, may 
be generally referred to as abortive attempts to kill, 
wound or capture animals. This would, for 
example, include the situation where park officials 
interrupted the hunt prior to the actual shooting of 
game. "Hunting," however, may also include the 
search for and pursuit of game. Compare, e. g., 
State v. Meinken, 10 NJ. 348, 91 A.2d 721 (1952). 
It is this aspect of "hunting" which has special 
applicability to the activities of Rodney Sanford. 
Prior to the point in time at which game is located, 
the guide is the member of the party most directly 
concerned with the search for and pursuit of game; 
it is for these services that he receives his 
compensation and it is this type of activity which 16 
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U.S.C. s 26 was designed to proscribe. 
We are untroubled by what may be viewed as a 
superficial inconsistency between our interpretation 
of R.C.M. s 26-307(3) and 16 U.S.C. s 26. It will 
be recalled that our relatively narrow reading of the 
Montana provision was influenced by a separate 
provision of the state fish and game laws dealing 
with the activities of outfitters and guides. We 
again emphasize that the Montana Code is quite 
specific in its regulation of fish and game; for 
example, separate provisions deal with the activities 
of outfitters, R.C.M. ss 26-904, 906, the use of 
aircraft to locate game, R.C.M. s 26-301, subd. 2, 
tagging of game, R.C.M. s 26-202.2(3) and the 
waste of game, R.C.M. s 26-307(1). We held only 
that the Government's sole reliance on R.C.M. s 
26-307(3) to establish a violation of state law was 
misplaced. In contrast with the specificity of the 
Montana Code, the federal statute is general and 
all-inclusive in nature. To read the federal statute 
as excluding the activities of hunting guides would 
defeat the obvious Congressional intention to 
preserve wildlife within Yellowstone National Park. 
It is this distinction which explains our differing 
treatment of the state and federal statutes. 
Count I: Conspiracy to Transport Illegally-Killed 
Animals in Interstate Commerce. 
[10][11] Count I of the indictment charges 
appellees with conspiracy to transport in interstate 
commerce parts of the dead bodies of the two elk 
and the sheep. The district court dismissed this 
count on the ground that appellees cannot be 
charged with conspiracy to commit a substantive 
crime when the scheme, if completed, does not 
constitute an offense against the United States. We 
disagree. Apart from the ultimate disposition of the 
substantive counts of the indictment charging 
interstate transportation of illegally killed animals, 
"the crime of conspiracy is complete upon the 
agreement to violate the law, as implemented by 
one or more overt acts . . ., and is not at all 
dependent upon the ultimate success or failure of 
the planned scheme." United States v. Thompson, 
493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 
834, 95 S.Ct 60, 42 L.Ed.2d 60 (1974). See also 
Craven v. United States,22 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir. 
1927), cert, denied, 276 U.S. 627, *109248 S.Ct. 
321, 72 L.Ed. 739 (1928). The Sanfords allegedly 
believed that Bagalio and Parker were bona fide 
hunters; it follows therefrom that they conspired to 
violate those laws that would have been violated 
had their assumption been correct. Ample overt 
acts exist and it is not necessary that these overt acts 
be criminal in nature. See United States v. 
Rabinowich,238 U.S. 78, 86-88, 35 S.Ct. 682, 59 
L.Ed. 1211 (1915). The facts alleged in the 
indictment, if proven, would establish a conspiracy 
under 18 U.S.C. s 371. 
We therefore reverse and remand for further 
proceedings on all counts of the indictment. 
547 F.2d 1085 
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Petitioner and Respondent, 
v. 
Russell L. DANIELSON, C. L. Duffy and Roy G. 
Riley, the Sheriff of Big 
HornCounty, Montana, Respondents and Appellants. 
No. 11139. 
Submitted April 11, 1967. 
Decided May 12, 1967. 
Appeal from order granting writ of habeas corups 
entered by the Thirteenth District Court, Big Horn 
County, Guy C. Deny, J. The Supreme Court, 
Doyle, J., held that statute which provides penalty for 
trespass to possessory rights of reservation Indians 
does not conflict with fish and game regulation by 
state. The Court further held that state enabling act 
which provides that Indian lands shall remain under 
'absolute jurisdiction and control' of Congress of 
United States did not deprive state of jurisdiction 
over the killing of two bull elk, by defendant, a non-
Indian, on Indian reservation during closed season. 
Order granting writ reversed. 
West Headnotes 
HI States €=>4.4(2) 
360k4.4(2) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 360k4.5, 360k0.5) 
Congress may exercise its powers to circumscribe 
exercise of state police power by virtue of supremacy 
clause of Federal Constitution. U.S.C A.Const. art. 6, 
cl.2. 
12] States €=>18.3 
360k 18.3 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 360k4.14) 
State statute may be effectively "pre-empted" by act 
of Congress directly inconsistent with state statute or 
by clear expression of intention to exclusively occupy 
limited field encompassing state statute. 
131 Game € ^ 3 . 5 
187k3.5 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 187k31/2) 
Regulation of elk hunting within borders of state is 
clearly a proper exercise of state's police power. 
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307(3). 
1£ Indians €==>32.8 
209k32.8 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(3), 209k36) 
Statute which makes act of going upon Indian 
reservation a violation if done for purpose of hunting 
or fishing provides a penalty for trespass to Indian 
reservation and is not an attempt by Congress to enter 
field of fish and game regulation. 18 U.S.C.A. § § 
1164,1165. 
151 Indians €=>32.7 
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 360k4.13) 
Statute which provides penalty for trespass to 
possessory rights of reservation Indians does not 
conflict with fish and game regulation by state. 
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307(3); 18 
U.S.C.A. S 1165. 
1£ Indians €=^>32.7 
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 360k4.13) 
Fact that it is possible to violate federal statute 
providing penalty for trespass to possessory rights of 
reservation Indians and state fish and game 
regulations by same act or acts does not require 
conclusion that there is a conflict between state and 
federal law. R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-
307(3); 18 U.S.C.A. S 1165. 
121 Criminal Law €^=>29(4) 
110k29(4) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k29) 
Under system of dual sovereignty single act may 
constitutionally constitute crime against both 
sovereigns. 
M Indians €=^>32.8 
209k32.8 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(3), 209k36) 
State enabling act which provides that Indian lands 
shall remain under "absolute jurisdiction and 
control" of Congress of United States did not deprive 
state of jurisdiction over the killing of two bull elk, 
by defendant, a 
non-Indian, on Indian reservation, during closed 
season. R.C.M.1947, § 26-307; Enabling Act, § 1 
etseq.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165. 
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121 Indians €=^32.7 
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 209k36) 
State has jurisdiction to enforce fish and game 
regulations on Indian reservations contained within 
its boundaries with respect to persons who are not 
tribal Indians unless precluded from doing so by act 
of Congress or unless such enforcement would 
interfere with self-government on reservation. 
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307. 
*439 **690 Forrest H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., 
Helena, Robert H. Wilson and Kenneth R. Neill, 
Hardin, Chadwick Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. 
(argued), Helena, for appellants. 
Lee Overfelt (argued), Billings, for respondent. 
DOYLE, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an order granting a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
James Nepstad a Non-Indian was arrested and 
charged with violating section 26- 307, R.C.M.1947, 
by killing two bull elk on the Crow Indian 
Reservation during the closed season. The accused 
petitioned the district court of the thirteenth judicial 
district for a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that 
the State of Montana was **691 without jurisdiction 
in this matter because *440 the elk were killed on a 
Crow Indian Reservation located in south-eastern 
Montana. The district court agreed with the 
petitioner and on order was entered April 12, 1966, 
granting the writ of habeas corpus releasing him from 
the custody of the Big Horn County Sheriff. The 
order contained the following statement '* * * It is 
elementary that all Indian lands within the State are 
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
United States. (See the Enabling Act of Montana) In 
any event, the Congress, by enacting the statute in 
question (Title 18, s 1165) on July 12, 1960, 
following the act of our Legislature in 1957, seems 
clearly to have pre-empted the field and left the 
jurisdiction to punish the petitioner, if he be guilty of 
any crime, in the courts of the United States * * * .' 
flir21 It is well-settled that the United States 
Congress may exercise its powers to circumscribe the 
exercise of state police power by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Clause 2; Morris v. Jones, 329 
U.S. 545, 91 L.Ed. 488, 67 S.Ct. 451, 168 A.L.R. 
656. A state statute may be effectively 'pre-empted' 
by an act of Congress directly inconsistent with the 
state statute or by a clear expression of an intention to 
exclusively occupy a limited field encompassing the 
state statute. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 
715, 56 L.Ed. 1182: Schwartz v. State of Texas, 344 
U.S. 199. 73 S.Ct. 232, 97 L.Ed. 231. 
[3] Regulation of elk hunting within the borders of 
the State of Montana is clearly a proper exercise of 
the state's police power. Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. 
Department of Natural Resources of the State of 
California. 9 Cir., 30 F.2d 111, and cases cited; State 
v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86. Section 
26-104, subd. (15), R.C.M.1947, authorizes the Fish 
and Game Commission to exercise the state's power 
with respect to setting seasons and fixing bag limits. 
Section 26-307, subd. (3), R.C.M.1947, provides that 
it is a misdemeanor to hunt game animals during a 
closed season. 
The first question presented in this appeal is whether 
Congress *441 has pre-empted all state regulation of 
fish and game on Indian reservations by enacting 
conflicting legislation. Section 1165 of Title 18, 
United States Code was the only federal statute cited 
as inconsistent and reads as follows: 
'Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, 
willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that 
belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group 
and either are held by the United States in trust or are 
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by 
the United States, or upon any lands of the United 
States that are reserved for Indian use, for the 
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or 
for the removal of game, peltries, or fish therefrom, 
shall be fined not more that $200 or imprisoned not 
more than ninety days, or both, and all game, fish, 
and peltries in his possession shall be forfeited.' P.L. 
86-634, s 2, 74 Stat. 469. 
|"4][51 It is significant to note that section 1165 does 
not directly prohibit hunting and fishing but makes 
the act of going upon the Indian reservation a 
violation if done for the purpose of hunting or 
fishing. Section 1165 expressly permits hunting and 
fishing on Indian reservations without additional 
federal regulation if proper permission or 
authorization is given for the entry. Therefore, 
section 1165 must be considered to be a statute 
providing a penalty for trespass to an Indian 
reservation and not an attempt by Congress to enter 
the field of fish and game regulation. This 
construction is fortified by the section preceding 
section 1165 wherein a penalty is provided for the 
destruction of boundary signs erected by Indian tribes 
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to give notice that hunting, trapping, and fishing on 
the reservation is not permitted without lawful 
authority or permission. Title 18, s 1164U.S.C. We 
hold that a statute which provides a penalty for 
trespass to the possessory rights of reservation **692 
Indians does not conflict with fish and game 
regulation by the State of Montana. 
Nothing has been advanced to this court to show that 
Congress has expressed an intention to occupy the 
field of fish and *442 game management on Indian 
reservations, nor would we concede that it could. A 
contrary general policy was noted in Organized 
Village of Kake v. Egan. 369 U.S. 60. 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 
L.Ed.2d 573. In the Kake case the United States 
Supreme Court demonstrated by historical discussion 
a continuing tendency to relax federal regulation over 
Indian affairs by permitting more tribal self-
government. A concurrent increase of the influence 
of state law on Indian reservations was also noted. 
\6)\7] The fact that it is possible to violate section 
1165 and Montana fish and game regulations by the 
same act or acts does not require the conclusion that 
there is a conflict between state and federal law. It 
has long been recognized that under our system of 
dual sovereignty a single act may constitutionally 
constitute a crime against both sovereigns. Bartkus 
v. People of State of Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 
676. 3 L.Ed.2d 684: Abbate v. U.S.. 359 U.S. 187. 79 
S.Ct.666.3L.Ed.2d729. 
Since Congress has not acted to exclude all state 
regulation of fish and game on Indian reservations 
the only remaining question is whether the state's 
regulatory power extends to a person who is not a 
tribal Indian hunting upon the reservation. This 
question is a subdivision of the larger question of 
whether the police power of the state may be 
extended to persons on Indian reservations who are 
not tribal Indians. In this connection respondent-
Nepstad contends in his brief that the State of 
Montana is precluded from exercising any regulatory 
power over persons on Indian reservations by section 
4, second part, of its own Enabling Act which reads 
as follows: 
'Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed 
(State of Montana) do agree and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title * * * to all lands 
lying within the said limits owned or held by any 
Indian or Indian tribes; * * * and said Indian lands 
shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the congress of the United States * * * .' 
Page 3 
£8] The effect of the above-quoted portion of the 
Montana *443 Enabling Act was considered in 
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240. 17 S.Ct. 107, 
41 L.Ed. 419. upon an appeal from a conviction of 
murder alleged to have been committed on an Indian 
reservation situated within the boundaries of the State 
of Montana. The Draper case followed an earlier U.S. 
Supreme Court decision by holding that the retention 
of'absolute jurisdiction and control' over Indian lands 
did not deprive the State of Montana of jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on reservations by other than 
Indians or against Indians. In Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, the United 
States Supreme Court declared that absent governing 
acts of Congress the test of the applicability of state 
law on Indian reservations is whether such 
application would interfere with reservation self-
government. The most recent statement on this 
question appears in the Kake Village case, supra, at 
369 U.S. 71, at 82 S.Ct. 568: 'The Senate amendment 
was designed simply to make clear what an 
examination of past statutes and decisions makes 
clear also: that the words 'absolute jurisdiction and 
control' are not intended to oust the State completely 
from regulation of Indian 'property (including fishing 
rights)'. 'Absolute' in s 4 carried the gloss of its 
predecessor statutes, meaning undiminished, not 
exclusive.' 
[9] From the foregoing we conclude that the State of 
Montana has jurisdiction to enforce its fish and game 
regulations on Indian reservations contained within 
its boundaries with respect to persons who are not 
tribal Indians unless precluded from doing so by an 
act of Congress or unless **693 such enforcement 
would interfere with self-government on the 
reservation. We have already discussed the absence 
of prohibiting or conflicting acts of Congress. 
Further, no convincing argument has been made to 
show how enforcement of state hunting and fishing 
regulations against a non-Indian would in any manner 
interfere with self-government of the reservation. 
Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when 
it decided that State Courts have no jurisdiction over 
non-Indians, particularly the respondent. 
*444 The order granting the writ is reversed. 
JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J , and ADAIR, 
CASTLES and JOHN C. HARRISON, JJ., concur. 
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